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 In surveys and studies analyzing corruption around the globe, Middle Eastern and North 
African countries consistently rank among the worst in the world with respect to the 
pervasiveness of corruption in both the public and private sector. The poor business ethics 
landscape makes it exceedingly difficult to do business in the region, while also undermining the 
development of effective political and economic institutions. The mismatch between societal 
virtues of shared prosperity and incentives for short-term, selfish reward amounts to what I call 
an ethical chasm, a symptom of cultural, political, and structural factors. This makes it critical 
that businesses and policymakers alike develop reform plans that will improve ethical decision 
making at the firm and individual level. This paper offers a tangible plan of action for public 
actors, individual firms, and civil society, with the objective of advancing reform efforts in the 
Arab World. 
 Before offering these practical changes, it is important to take a step back and look at 
what might be driving the perceived poor business ethics environment in the region. I begin with 
a historical survey of business in the Middle East, beginning with the end of the Ottoman Empire 
to the present day. In doing so, important differences between the region’s economic 
development and other areas of the world are illuminated. The main finding is that although the 
Arab world was subject to many of the same forces that brought the developed world into its 
modern form, these forces, namely globalization, failed to produce the same kinds of economic 
results in the Middle East. Following this historical survey is a discussion of corruption, its 
impacts, and its relevant in the business ethics context. Furthermore, I analyze data from 
corruption surveys to compare the region with its counterparts, as well as to compare sub-regions 
within the Arab world.  
 With this important context, I lay out what are the major cultural, political, and structural 
underpinnings to the problem of corruption and business ethics in the region, relying on evidence 
from faith, cultural norms, violent conflict, and the law. These factors color what constitute 
ethical or moral behavior in the business context and help focus reformers on important targets 
for change.  
 Finally, utilizing the framework developed through analysis of the business ethics 
environment, I propose reforms for public, private, and civil society actors. These reforms, which 
include plans like stronger anti-corruption enforcement and a greater sense of firm responsibility 
are designed to be practical, long-term changes to the ethical issues facing business in the Middle 
East. In doing so, I hope to bolster ongoing reform efforts both in and outside the region, with 





In December 2010, the streets of the Arab world filled with throngs of youthful, angry 
voices, their cries of “the people demand the fall of the regime” echoing through the cities of 
Cairo, Tunis, and beyond. This tidal wave of Arab rage would soon become known as the Arab 
Spring, collapsing regimes that had stood over four decades and sending others into violent 
armed conflict. In its wake, many scholars attempted to trace the causes of the demonstrations, 
but given the diversity of the region’s governments, historical lineages, and religious makeups, a 
consensus impetus has remained elusive. That being said, there are a many popular explanations 
that purport to have the answer. For example, some have argued that the movement was the 
result of the digital revolution, wherein the rise of mobile phones and social media platforms 
gave previously incapacitated masses the ability to mobilize for collective action against regimes 
that were already heavily detested by their populations.
1
 Others have blamed the failure of Arab 
dictatorships to respond to economic and environmental shifts in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
that forced thousands formerly rural families to move to urban areas, causing unemployment and 
economic frustration to skyrocket.
2
 These perspectives represent just a bare few of the many that 
have attempted to explain the precursors to the Arab Spring, whose nature has captured the 
fascination of academics, journalists, and regional analysts alike.  
                                                        
1 Hussain, Muzammil M., Philip N. Howard. (2013). What Best Explains Successful Protest Cascades? 
ICTs and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring. International Studies Review, 
doi: 10.1111/misr.12020 
2 De Châtel, F. (2014). The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: Untangling 
the Triggers of the Revolution. Middle Eastern Studies, 50(4), 521-535. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2013.850076 




Yet while it is clear that the causes of the Arab Spring are many, there lies a common 
thread behind most, if not all of such perspectives: that the anger in the Arab Street was to some 
extent the result of economic frustrations, and chief among them the problem of public and 
private corruption. That is not to say that corruption was the pivotal factor that moved millions of 
Arabs to take to the streets in 2011, but rather that it was a key constituent in a confluence of 
economic failures. It is probable, for example, that spikes in food prices and inflation in the years 
leading up to the Arab Spring became conflated with suffocating corruption; Opaque fiscal and 
monetary policies left the public in the dark as to what was driving slow growth and in some 
cases, economic contraction. However, the punishing hand of fassad (Arabic for corruption) was 
seen and felt by all. As a result, what may have been one of many factors generating economic 
frustration became the rallying point through which protestors expressed their anger. In fact, the 
spark that lit the fuse was the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, who 
took his in own life when state authorities harassed him for failing to pay bribes to continue his 
business.
3
 Mohamed’s story resonated with the hundreds of thousands of youths in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA)
4
 region who felt disenfranchised by a corrupt and unethical 
business environment.  
                                                        
3 Fisher, M. (2011, March 26). In Tunisia, act of one fruit vendor sparks wave of revolution through 
Arab world. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-
tunisia-act-of-one-fruit-vendor-sparks-wave-of-revolution-through-arab-
world/2011/03/16/AFjfsueB_story.html 
4 A quick note on the usage of MENA and the Middle East: The two are used interchangeably 
throughout this paper and are used to describe the Arabic speaking region stretching from Morocco 
to Iraq. Specific references to sub-regions within the Middle East will be explicit i.e. “North Africa” 








The failure of Arab regimes to tackle corruption left many Arabs with a hopeless 
economic future and ultimately, through the subsequent demonstrations, to the creation of a 
regional order whose long-term results, despite more disappointing recent developments, remain 
to be seen. In a hope to understand this phenomenon, this paper aims to trace the political, 
cultural, and structural factors in the MENA region that contribute to the poor business ethics 
landscape, the very factors that led Mohamed Bouazizi to do what he did on a balmy summer 
night in Tunis. Furthermore, in identifying these systemic issues, this paper will provide 
solutions to the public and private corruption crisis in the region, with the goal of providing 
practical reforms for Arab governments and enterprises alike.   
                                                        
5 Ramdani, N. (2011, January 17). Greed of the Tunisian president's wife that drove a nation onto 





What are Business Ethics, Exactly?  
 Before delving into our discussion of business ethics in the Middle East, it is 
important to outline exactly what is meant by ‘business ethics.’ The phrase is composed of 
two integral parts, the first being ‘business’ and the latter, ‘ethics.’ The real opportunity for 
confusion lies in the latter term, which on its own can refer to a number of things. For our 
purposes, ethics refers to the field of philosophy that seeks to answer the question “what 
should I do?” In other words, ethics is the study of the correct or moral (which has its own 
set of connotations) decisions. What exactly constitutes the right decisions are, of course, 
subject to debate, but there are a number of ethical theories that help us discuss the nature 
of moral decision making. These theories form the basis of normative ethics, which seeks to 
explain the nature of ethical actions.  
Virtue Ethics 
 One such theory is virtue ethics, the brainchild of Ancient Greek philosophers Plato 
and Aristotle, which focuses on virtues and the moral character of individuals.6 These 
virtues are traits that make one an exemplar of moral values, like courage, honesty, 
generosity, etc.  Conversely, vices are to be avoided, as being in direct contrast with their 
virtuous counterparts. Virtue ethics also discourages extremes with respect to any specific 
character trait. With this in mind, virtue ethics purports that the moral or correct decisions 




                                                        





 Utilitarianism refers to the ethical theory that holds moral actions as those actions 
that maximize happiness.7,8 Some utilitarians postulate that utilitarianism is not limited to 
the individual, but rather, to all actions that maximize happiness and minimize 
unhappiness for the greatest number of people. Utilitarianism is less about creating set 
moral rules (although rule utilitarians would disagree, see supra note 8) and more about 
weighing the costs and benefits of a particular action. Utilitarianism might then be 
considered a consequentialist ethical theory, in the sense that it is concerned more with the 
consequences of the act rather than the act itself. 
Deontologicalism  
 Deontological theories stand in stark contrast with utilitarianism, particularly 
because they purport the existence of ironclad moral rules that denote what is ethical and 
unethical. For example, a deontological ethicist might argue that lying is wrong no matter 
what, even if a lie stands to maximize the happiness and minimize the unhappiness of the 
greatest number of people. One major formulation of deontologicalism is Kantianism,9 
which stipulates that one should act in such a way that they would will it a universal law.10 
                                                        
7 Posner, R. A. (1979). Utilitarianism, economics, and legal theory. The Journal of Legal Studies, 8(1), 
103-140. 
8 There is an important distinction between two modes of thought in utilitarianism. 1. Act 
utilitarians will look at a particular act and weight the benefits and costs of the act. If they find that 
the benefits outweigh the costs and that happiness is maximized, then they would indeed hold the 
act as being ethical 2. Rule utilitarians instead define a set of moral rules that will maximize 
happiness and then use these rules to weigh the value of a particular action.    
9 Named for its founder, Immanuel Kant.  
10 Alexander, L., & Moore, M. (2007). Deontological ethics. 
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This golden rule of sorts helps to create the very moral rules that deontologicalism 
purports to exist.  
These theories, although certainly not exhaustive, illustrate the difficulty of 
assigning normative answers to questions of ethics. Nonetheless, they form the basis of 
contemporary ethical debates, and ultimately, bring color to understanding ethics in the 
business context. Without understanding the underlying principles that support ethical 
decision making at the firm and managerial level, it is easy to get muddled in debates of 
ethics as a matter of opinion, when in reality there are clear moral choices available. 
Whether an action is moral for utilitarian reasons or as a universal truth is somewhat 
irrelevant in the business world: firms and managers often have many competing 
responsibilities to a number of different stakeholders and it is incumbent upon them to 
take actions that recognize this unique position.  
Given this, most conceptions of ‘business ethics’ place a particular emphasis on the 
role of business in the community, which extends to both internal and external 
stakeholders.11 In many respects, this “community focus” of business ethics is the product 
of stakeholder theory, which argues that businesses have a responsibility to not just their 
shareholders, but to other parties affected by the activities of the business, such as 
employees, community members, government, etc.12, 13 Decades after it was first 
introduced, stakeholder theory has achieved widespread acceptance in academic and 
professional circles as an effective mode of promoting ethical decision making at the firm 
                                                        
11 Wicks, A. (2003). A Note on Ethical Decision-Making. Darden Case No. UVA-E-0242. Retreived 
from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1278345  
12 Donaldson, Thomas, and Lee E. Preston. "The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, 
evidence, and implications." Academy of management Review 20.1 (1995): 65-91. 
13 Stakeholder theory was first outlined by R. Edward Freeman in his highly influential 1984 book, 
Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach.  
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level. At the same time, confusing stakeholder conscious decision making for business 
ethics in a broad sense is a mistake. For instance, there is a tendency for some firms to 
confuse business ethics with a publicized Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)14 strategy, 
but in the process only support token causes. In reality, analyzing business ethics 
necessitates a top-to-bottom view of an organization. In particularly large firms, thousands 
of important decisions are made every day, at the entry level all the way up to the C-suite. 
This heightens the importance of firm culture, internal controls, and the ethical leadership 
of managers, among other key players in the organization.  
Business ethics might then be summarized as the study of how firms and their 
constituent members make what they believe are the right decisions amidst a web of 
competing interests and goals. Firms are quite often confronted with scenarios that pit the 
interests of shareholders against some other stakeholder group. However, what might 
constitute an ‘ethics conscious firm’ is the ability of the firm to weigh both the 
consequences and the principles around a business decision.15 There is no set formula for 
achieving this dynamic in the corporate setting, but decision-makers in the firm should be 
asking important ethical questions as they weigh their options for action.  
Why might a firm care about the moral and ethical weight of their decisions if their 
overarching purpose is to maximize value for shareholders? For one thing, there is a dearth 
of literature and studies that point to a link between commitment to ethical values and 
                                                        
14 Although it predates stakeholder theory (see supra note 13), the widespread adoption of CSR is 
an outgrowth of the increased emphasis on corporate responsibility beyond shareholder value. 
Today, many companies publish CSR reports in addition to traditional financial statements. 
15 This approach bridges consequentialist and deontological approaches to ethical decision making 
(see supra pg. 9). The idea behind this mixed-approach is to highlight that there is not exactly a 
right way of getting to an ethical decision, but rather that the firm should at least be thinking about 
ethical concerns in its decision making process. 
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financial performance.16 Additionally, in the age of the more active ‘ethically conscious 
consumer,’ ethical scandals can create a public relations disaster that severely impacts the 
firm’s financial position. News stories about a firm’s unethical practices may reduce 
investor and consumer confidence in the leadership of the firm, resulting in losses to the 
firm’s value.17 In fact, a common theme in business ethics is the so-called “front page test,” 
which encourages business decision makers to consider whether or not they would feel 
comfortable with their actions being reported on the front page of a newspaper.18 
With this in mind, the factors that might make a firm or business decision ethical 
may differ in accordance with societal and cultural values. However, there are certain 
maxims that are in fact universal to the practice of trade. For instance, intentional fraud, 
dishonesty, and intent to do harm, among many other principles should be common to all 
businesses. Often times, the right action should be clear, but it is the gray areas that make 
the study of ethics so interesting and important. For the purposes of this paper, business 
ethics is used in a broad sense - the general degree to which firms and individuals engage 
with ethical questions in the decision making process. As we will discover, the poor 
business ethics environment in the Middle East and North Africa has a pointed impact on 
the success of individual firms, as well as on regional development as a whole.  
 
                                                        
16 Verschoor, C. C. (1998). A study of the link between a corporation's financial performance and its 
commitment to ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(13), 1509-1516. 
17 A case-in-point is the 2016 Wells Fargo scandal, in which the firm’s culture and management 
practices were blamed for pressuring employees to open unauthorized accounts for their clients in 
order to collect additional fees. The scandal resulted in a $25 billion loss in Wells Fargo’s market 
cap, thousands of employees fired, and the resignation of CEO John Stumpf. McIntyre, D. (2016, 
October 1). Well Fargo Loses $25 Billion in Market Cap. 24/7 Wall St. Retrieved from 
http://247wallst.com/banking-finance/2016/10/01/well-fargo-loses-25-billion-in-market-cap/ 
18 Logsdon, J. M., & Wood, D. J. (2002). Business citizenship: From domestic to global level of 
analysis. Business Ethics Quarterly, 12(02), 155-187. 
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Historical Survey of Business in the Middle East I: A Model of “Disjointed 
Development” 
 Understanding the current business landscape requires taking a step back to examine the 
path the led to the present state. Although it is certainly the case that the Middle East lagged 
behind industrialized Western states with respect to economic development, it is a mistake to 
assume that little economic infrastructure was in place in the region prior to the discovery of oil 
in the early 20
th
 Century. In fact, much of the Middle East, then under the control of the Ottoman 
Empire, began to integrate features of the new, merchant-oriented economic system that 







included an increased emphasis on industrial output and trade, encouraging the movement of 
rural fellahin (peasants) to urban areas for greater economic opportunities. Yet at the same time, 
economic modernization in the resource scarce Middle East failed to produce results anywhere 
near what was experienced in the Western bloc, particularly as the Ottoman Empire began to 
collapse in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries.  
The subsequent decentralization of power in Arab lands allowed local rulers to enact 
sweeping real estate consolidation programs, as well as unchecked tax and regulatory policies, 
leaving much of the region’s wealth consolidated in the hands of a wealthy, urban elite class.
20
 
To compound the problems faced by merchants and farmers of the region alike, the advent of 
European imperialism following the Ottoman Empire’s demise generated colonial states that 
further consolidated economic power in the hands of an elite upper class, a precursor to the 
                                                        
19 Gelvin, J. (2016). The Modern Middle East: A History (4th ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
20 Ibid. 108-109 
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subsequent authoritarian regimes that would come to dominate the Middle East.
21
 The results 
were ultimately disastrous for the region’s long-term sustainable development, normalizing the 
construction of societies where economic goods became a tool for patronage and maintaining the 
status quo, rather than promoting innovation and widespread economic opportunity. Business, as 
it manifested at the time, was largely centered on the promotion of the interests of the state and 
the economic elite, slowing the growth of critical economic institutions necessary to support a 
vibrant market economy.  
 These developments were accompanied by a dramatic increase in the worldwide demand 
for oil, turning the many fledgling, post-colonial Arab states into lucrative options for foreign 
drilling companies.
22
 The rapid increase in oil exports filled the coffers of local rulers, but left 
them few incentives to promote economic diversification. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, the 
Middle East had been transformed into a mix of nationalist autocratic states that relied chiefly on 
patronage to maintain power and oil-fueled autocratic states that used their newfound wealth to 
place a bandage over tribal and sectarian divisions. Additionally, many Arab states enacted 
socialist policies that distorted market forces and made both starting and maintaining a business a 
supremely challenging endeavor. These turbulent historical shifts had the effect of leaving little 
room for the formation of a traditional market system, the creation of free and fair courts, and the 
maturity of the corporate form. Instead, what was left behind was a system that, although awash 
with wealth, promoted corruption and cronyism: a so-called “model of disjointed development,” 
where advancing of some segments of society was prioritized over overall regional health.  
                                                        
21 Richards, A., Waterbury, J., Cammett, M., & Diwan, I. (2015). A Political Economy of the Middle 
East (4th ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
22 Ibid. 289-291. Gelvin.  
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Historical Survey of Business in the Middle East II: The Role of Globalization  
 While a long-view of the region’s developmental history certainly yields insights into the 
region’s structural challenges, more recent developments help place the current business ethics 
environment in context. The importance of recent history is connected largely to the rise of 
economic globalization and integration, a phenomenon with a complicated relationship to the 
modern Middle Eastern political economy. As such, globalization and its impact on the Middle 
East will be a central theme in this paper.  
Few geopolitical forces have radically transformed the world economy as much as 
globalization, and yet, there remains disagreement as to what it precisely means. In his article for 
Government and Opposition, Colin Hay discusses the importance of defining globalization in a 
narrow sense, to ensure that it is understood as “an outcome of causal processes rather than a 
causal process in its own right.”
23
 He further highlights a definition heralded by David Held, 
Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton in their article Global 
Transformations, that is fairly adept for the purposes of this historical survey: “globalization is a 
process (or set of processes) that embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social 
relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or inter-regional flows and networks of 
activity, interaction and power”
24
 This definition, as Hay argues, goes beyond just regional 
political developments, European integration a prominent example, but encompasses the scope 
of new economic networks created by trade liberalization and technological advancements.
25
  
                                                        
23 Hay, C. (2006), What's Globalization Got to Do with It? Economic Interdependence and the Future 
of European Welfare States1. Government and Opposition, 41: 1–22. doi:10.1111/j.1477-
7053.2006.00168.x 
24 Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., Perraton, J. (1999). Contents and Introduction in Global 
Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1-31 
25 Ibid, 4.  
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With this definition in mind, we can firmly see the hand globalization played in Middle Eastern 
development, particularly in the last 25 years.  
 However, before analyzing the role of globalization in the MENA region’s economic 
history and ultimately, its relationship with economic corruption, it is important to understand 
why globalization has taken center stage in corruption and business ethics scholarship. By 
connecting developing countries with states whose political and economic structures were still in 
their infancy, globalization forces helped bring explosive growth to emerging markets. However, 
the increased cross-border transaction activity and flurry of foreign direct investment also invited 
opportunity for political and economic abuse. With weak regulatory regimes and even weaker 
enforcement mechanisms, developing states had little capabilities with which to detect and 
combat corruption in the wake of economic growth. Uncontrolled growth opened a backdoor to 
abuses of power, contributing to the formation of a poor business ethics environment in the 
developing world. 
 Of course this theory is just among many other competing ideas about the relationship 
between globalization and economic corruption. In their article for The International Journal of 
Business and Finance Research, Jayoti Das and Cassandra DiRienzo examined the impact of 
globalization on corruption, highlighting the apparent paradox between two competing theories - 
that “some researchers have argued that globalization has increased the opportunity for corrupt 
practices, while others state that globalization has led to a decrease in corruption as countries 
wishing to join the global economy must comply with international anti-corruption rules and 
regulations.”
26
 In analyzing the relationship between corruption and globalization, Das and 
DiRienzo’s found that “the highest corruption levels are realized at moderate or transitioning 
                                                        
26 Das, Jayoti and DiRienzo, Cassandra, The Nonlinear Impact of Globalization on Corruption (2009). 
The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 33-46, 2009. Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1634083 
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levels of globalization,” but as developing countries become more compliant with tougher 
regulations and anti-corruption mechanisms, the relationship begins to level off.
27
 These findings 
bolster my initial claims, and are particularly relevant in the MENA context, which underwent its 
own period of globalization transition in the 1980s and 90s.  
 Beyond the potential role globalization played in expanding opportunities for political 
and economic corruption, there are other, more practical reasons that globalization has taken 
center stage on corruption scholarship. By its very nature, the process of globalization increases 
the interconnectedness of economies, multiplying the degree to which events in one system can 
affect the functioning of another. In their paper The Globalization of Corruption for the Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Patrick Glynn, Stephen Korbin, and Moises Naim examine 
the role of globalization in increasing interest in corruption as a field of study, writing that the 
“broadening and deepening of global economic integration increases the probability that the 
effects of corruption will spill over and resonate throughout the world economy,” and further that 
“the emergence of an electronically networked international financial system markedly enhances 




 In response to heightened concerns about corruption, many Western states developed 
tough anti-corruption statutes. For example, the United States enacted the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act in 1977, which prohibits U.S. companies from bribing public officials in foreign 
countries.
29
 With pressure from the American government, other countries began following suit 
in the 1980s and 1990s, when a global enforcement regime of anti-corruption measures began to 
                                                        
27 Ibid. 42.  
28 Glynn, P., Kobrin, S. J., & Naim, M. (1997). The globalization of corruption. Corruption and the 
global economy, 6, 10-17. 




take form. Despite this trend, many countries, including those in the developed world, still lacked 
the legal and regulatory regimes to combat corruption and promote equitable business practices. 
This included Germany, which even allowed its firms to “deduct foreign bribes from German 
taxes if those bribes were necessary to win business.”
30
 It was not until the late 1990s, when the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank adopted 
stringent corruption and ethics standards in direct response to the poor enforcement of piecemeal 
domestic initiatives, that stronger rules were put in place.
31
 Yet as the developed world become 
better equipped to combat corruption in the age of globalization, developing states still lacked 
the tools and frameworks necessary to ensure that the flurry of economic activity in their 
countries would not succumb to the forces of abuse. Herein lies the paradox highlighted by Das 
and DiRenzo; the greater the degree of economic development, the more likely a state is to see 
controlled or reduced corruption activity, but growing economies create greater opportunities for 
corruption as they transition to development. The result is profound: the strong anti-corruption 
measures developed in the 1980s and 1990s did little to control the systemic risk for corruption 
where it was most present: the developing world.  
In addition to ushering in an age of unprecedented cross-border economic activity and 
economic interconnectedness, globalization also encouraged states to pursue aggressive trade 
liberalization policies. The rise of sprawling multinational corporations pressured policymakers 
to reduce trade barriers and promote international economic activity. Although many economists 
agree that the overall economic benefits of trade liberalization exceeded the costs, the uneven 
                                                        
30 Baron. D. (2008). Siemens Anatomy of Bribery. Case No.P68. Stanford, CA: Stanford Graduate 
School of Business 
31 Huther, J., & Shah, A. (2000). Anti-corruption policies and programs: a framework for evaluation 
(Vol. 2501). World Bank Publications. 
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impact on different industries and countries is well documented.
32
 Most notably, wealthier, more 
developed nations saw a sizable percentage of their low wage labor shifted to developing 
nations, as it became less costly to produce in states with cheaper labor markets and less 
regulation. This era of free trade and globalization was ultimately a boon for Asian countries in 
particular, which quickly positioned themselves as attractive places for manufacturing and goods 
production. As a result, East Asian countries achieved the highest rate of growth of GDP per 
capita than any other region post 1960, exceeding even OECD states.
33
 Given the success East 
and South Asian countries experienced in the era of free trade, one would expect to see a similar 
pattern in regions that followed the East Asian model of development, but as we will see, this 
was especially not the case in the Arab world.  
Enter the Middle East and North Africa in the late 1970s and early 1980s, then on the 
cusp of major economic and policy changes. Oil prices increased dramatically during this period, 
increasing the economic importance of the region and enriching the oil producing Gulf states, but 
new investment was heavily concentrated within the industry and in its export hubs, neglecting 
other opportunities for growth. During this period, Arab policymakers recognized the threat of a 
failure to adapt to the rapidly globalizing world marketplace, carrying out sound fiscal and 
monetary policies to make the region more attractive for economic expansion and FDI.
34
 Yet at 
the same time, the region became mired in a series of military conflicts, including but not limited 
to the Iraq-Iran War and the Lebanese Civil War, which effectively handicapped economic 
growth in the region. Additionally, a failure by Arab governments to diversify from oil exports 
stunted manufacturing growth, creating a massive gulf between the absolute size of the region’s 
                                                        
32 "Fast Track Authority." IGM Forum. The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, 11 Nov. 
2014. Web. 23 Aug. 2016. <http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-
results?SurveyID=SV_d68906VNWqVmiGN>. 
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manufacturing exports relative to other developing regions.
35
 Where Saudi Arabia’s per capita 
GDP was higher than Taiwan’s in the 1950s, today it is half, illustrating the lack of sustained 
economic growth that has plagued the region for decades.
36
 Furthermore, as Bernard Hoekman 
and Ahmed Galal argue in their book Arab Economic Integration: between hope and reality, the 
failure of Arab governments to develop integrated political and economic regions similar to 
those seen in Europe and elsewhere hampered the pace of trade liberalization and encouraged 
inwardness instead of cooperation.
37
 At a time when the world became increasingly linked 
through political, economic, and social ties, the Middle East countries remained isolated relative 
to other regions. 
Given these developments, it appears on the surface that the globalization moment may 
have skipped over the Middle East. What effect, if any, could globalization then have on 
corruption and business ethics in the Middle East? Of course, the above picture of globalization’s 
place in the Middle East is an incomplete one; certainly, macro-level indicators tend to support 
the conclusion that the Middle East failed to adequately prepare for the increasing 
interconnectedness of the global economy, but at the same time, globalization affected the scope 
and size of Middle Eastern businesses in a profound way. As discussed earlier, there was an 
abject failure by Arab states to diversify away from oil exports, but this did not leave the region 
untouched from the forces of globalization. This largely manifested in the corporatization of 
state-owned industries, along with an increasing pace of privatization. However, in the context of 
“disjointed development,” wherein much of the region’s wealth remained concentrated in the 
ruling political class, the increasing scale of state businesses mainly supported the ballooning 
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wealth of the urban elite. Small and medium sized businesses (SMEs), which continue to 
dominate the Middle Eastern business landscape, were thus at a disadvantage. Additionally, the 
1980s and 90s should have also seen a rise in firm competitiveness, especially as Arab states 
adopted free market principles in an effort to join the wave of trade liberalization sweeping the 
globe. However, as Samiha Fawzy discusses in the World Bank’s publication, Globalization and 
Firm Competitiveness in the Middle East and North Africa Region, “many firms in MENA 
continue to be dominated by individuals, they lack good corporate governance, they compete 
based on price alone, and they lack up-to-date managerial and technological resources.”
38
 The 
failure to develop competitive markets has left Middle Eastern corporations susceptible to 
mismanagement and even more concerning, the specter of corruption and political patronage. 
Furthermore, the rise of large distribution, real estate, and holding companies squeezed out the 
growth potential of small and medium sized businesses, whose troubles in the MENA region will 
be well documented in this paper. Given this historical trajectory, it appears that although 
globalization did in fact leave its mark on the region, it did so rather superficially, leaving 
cronyism in place of competitiveness and diversification. The result is a modern Middle Eastern 
economy that lacks the kinds of corporate governance standards or political mechanisms to 
enforce regulations.  
The effects of this historical legacy are central to understanding the present business 
landscape in the MENA region. During a period where Western businesses and corporations 
developed into their modern forms, Arab businesses were struggling to find a place among the 
instability and corruption. And although some of the Arab states have experienced growth across 
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a number of industries and glistening skyscrapers continue to top out in the capitals of Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) member-states, many of the structural problems that emerged over 
the last few hundred years remain looming below the surface. Through the anger expressed in the 
Arab Spring, we can see clearly that the region’s history of uneven development continues to 
plague its business environment, making it all the more urgent that such problems are addressed 
as a matter of state and societal policy.  
Corruption and the MENA Region 
Defining Corruption: A Narrow Construction or a Spectrum?  
 Although the intuition behind corruption is relatively simple - that it describes the abuse 
of power to achieve a contra-legal or contra-ethical private gain - its nature is such that it escapes 
a simple definition. Corruption manifests itself in a myriad of ways, including, but not limited to 
bribery, embezzlement, fraud, nepotism, and extortion. It can further be separated into categories 
of public or private abuse and differentiated on macro and micro levels. The most prominent 
international anti-corruption watchdog, Transparency International, categorizes corruption into 
three broad buckets: grand corruption, which describes “acts committed at a high level of 
government that... [enable] leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good,” petty corruption 
or abuses committed by low and mid-level officials, and political corruption, which refers to an 
institutionalized set of policies that perpetuate the wealth and advantage of those in power at the 
expense of those not.
39
 These categories are indeed useful in analyzing the impact of corruption 
                                                        




in regional contexts, and as I will argue later, the latter two are particularly problematic in the 
MENA region. Yet in the same step, they are inadequate in encapsulating the wider scope of 
corruption. Part of what makes a singular definition of the concept so difficult is that it takes on 
different meanings in different contexts. Cultural differences, for example, may dictate that what 
qualifies as corruption in one society is in fact be acceptable in another. This phenomenon is 
particularly observed in the Arab world, where, for example, the concept of wasta, which 
encourages the use of personal connections for private gain, often at the expense of normal 
operating procedures, is seen as a relatively benign aspect of doing business. This contrasts 
greatly with Western norms, which would likely consider wasta transactions as contrary to both 
law and business ethics.  
 This example highlights the need to avoid a narrow definition for corruption. In fact, a 
case could be made that corruption should be instead viewed as a spectrum, subject to cultural, 
legal, and political norms in a regional context. That is not to say that corruption should be 
viewed as relative to each culture, but rather that it requires a more nuanced understanding in 
specific contexts. The implication is that the much of the research produced on corruption in the 
last few decades, particularly in developing regions, has suffered from an almost pigeonholed 
focus on easy to measure indicators, which may have varying significance in different cultures 
and regions.  
There is no shortage of articles and empirical research papers that track, for example, the 
relationship between bribes and economic growth or the impact of bribery on foreign direct 
investment. In his book, Syndromes of Corruption,  Michael Johnston argues that such observers 
have a tendency to treat “bribery - usually involving international aid and trade, and often at high 
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levels - as a synonym for corruption in general.”
40
 He extends his criticism to other dominant 
trends in international corruption analysis, like the reliance on corruption perception measures, 
most notably, Transparency International’s Corruption Index (CPI). Although useful in many 
cases, he explains, such indices, which often ask respondents particularly about the degree to 
which bribery affects the local business environment, treat bribery “as a particular kind of quid 
pro quo set apart by its illegitimate nature but otherwise open to analysis as just another process 
of exchange.”
41
 This focus on easy to measure quid pro quo corruption tells only a part of the 
story, emphasizing bribery at the expense of other important corruption factors. Johnston 
continues, explaining that “in some corrupt exchanges, such as patronage and nepotism, 
considerable time may elapse between receiving the quid and repaying the quo, and the exchange 
may be conditioned by many factors other than immediate gain.”
42
 This point is particularly 
salient in the MENA context, where patronage and nepotism (see supra ‘wasta’) play a 
significant role in maintaining political and economic order.  
Is it not inadequate then, to measure only those easily identifiable examples of exchange, 
which may even have a reduced significance in the regional business and political climate? As 
such, this paper will examine the full slate of political, cultural, and structural forces that 
perpetuate the poor business ethics climate in the Middle East. This approach recognizes that 
corruption cannot be easily defined or identified, but rather that it must be viewed in full view of 
the regional business environment. That being said, there is value in taking stock of the broad 
indicators of corruption, particularly for placing the MENA region in a comparative context. In a 
future chapter (see Corruption in the Middle East and North Africa), I review the existing 
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data on corruption in the Arab world, with an emphasis on how aforementioned petty and 
political forms of corruption impact internal and external corruption perceptions of the Middle 
East. In doing so, we can understand the principal drivers of corruption in the region, and 
ultimately, the impact on investment, growth, and stability. 
Why Study Corruption? 
 
 Although this paper aims to analyze the business ethics landscape in the MENA region, it 
also places a heavy emphasis on the role of corruption in Middle Eastern economic development. 
It is true that corruption is not a perfect mode of analysis for understanding a business ethics 
landscape, and as discussed earlier, the degree to which corruption itself is measurable poses 
some difficulties. However, it is the most tangible way to assign quantitative data with which to 
compare the region against its counterparts. Beyond this more practical impetus, the sharp effects 
of corruption on both political and economic society merit a deeper discussion of its 
pervasiveness.  
 Corruption accelerates the transfer of wealth to concentrated hands. It undermines the 
faith of people in both their economic and political institutions. It stifles economic growth and 
investment. It robs entrepreneurs of their dreams and discourages youth from even starting their 
own. It fills the squares with demonstrators and can topple even the most entrenched of dictators. 
This is the story of how corruption depresses the quality of economic and political systems; it is 
the story of the Middle East & North Africa, a region that encapsulates the damaging effects 
pervasive corruption can inflict. Corruption indeed only represents a piece of the region’s 
problems, but its reaches are very impactful on cultural, political and economic levels. 
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The Relationship Between Corruption and GDP Per Capita  
 One way to examine the impact of corruption is to analyze its relationship with economic 
output. In simple terms, this analysis explains the correlation between corruption and the relative 
economic productivity of a state. This model looks specifically at the potential correlation 
between corruption level and GDP per capita, a common measure used to compare the relative 
strength of economies. In order to quantify this relationship, we can test a model for the true 
relationship between corruption and GDP per capita, denoted as follows: 
 
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥 + 𝜖 
 
Where y = GDP per capita, 𝛽0 = intercept, 𝛽1 = Corruption Level, X = slope, 𝜖 = random error.  
 The model relies on data for the most recent GDP per capita numbers for 176 countries 
from the World Bank and Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2016 scores 
(higher scoring countries have lower perceived corruption levels). Using this data, we can 
construct a sample model to estimate the relationship: 
 
y = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑥 
  
Running a regression analysis using the above model and the associated data yields the 




All data sourced from World Bank and Transparency International
43, 44
 
 The results of the regression analysis reveal a positive correlation between a higher CPI 
score (meaning lower corruption level) and GDP per capita. This finding resonates with our 
expectation that the greater the level of economic development in a given country, the more 
likely corruption will be controlled (see Historical Survey of Business in the Middle East II: 
The Role of Globalization).  
We can also use the data from the regression analysis to confirm the significance of the 
relationship between GDP per capita and corruption level: * 
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*The test statistics show significance for the slope at the 95% CI level, indicating some 
positive relationship between lower corruption levels and GDP per capita. 
 This model, although simple in scope, highlights the important role corruption plays in 
the course of economic development. And yet, it provides little detail as to what is driving the 
relationship, but with the help of existing literature, we might unpack the nature of this 
correlation.  
Corruption as a Constraint to Growth, Stability, and Security 
Michael Johnston, one of the foremost experts on corruption in developing regions, 
describes the relationship between corruption and the aforementioned factors as “syndromes,” 
and argues that “corrupt transactions, via the signals they send and incentives they confer, can 
ripple through an entire economic or political system.”
45
 Johnston correctly believes that 
corruption cannot be viewed in isolation; a focus on its immediate impacts ignores the grander 
consequences it can have on a nation’s healthy development.  
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 Johnston also cites the work of corruption experts like Susan Rose-Ackerman of Yale 
Law School, among others, who argue that corruption and bribery distort the role of supply and 
demand in determining market-clearing prices.
46
 This results in market inefficiencies that disrupt 
the normal flow of business and trade, depressing economic growth. It is common belief in 
academic and economic circles that free and fair markets are the bedrock of economic 
development and growth. This so-called “Washington Consensus,” a mode of policies that has 
dominated developmental economics since the 1990s, calls for across the board economic and 
trade liberalization to promote global growth. A report by the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development highlights the spirit of the Washington Consensus, calling for 
“institutions that encourage private investment and export growth: free and fair markets; sound 
macroeconomic management; clearly and consistently applied policies, regulations and laws; 
secure property rights; and functioning commercial courts.”
47
 Furthermore, institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank often require developing nations to 
adopt pro-market policies, including free-trade and growth inducing regulatory policies as a 
precursor to receiving international financing. As a result, developing nations are incentivized to 
enact free market and pro-growth economic policies.  
In theory, these “best practices” should help improve the economy, as well as the 
confidence investors and citizens alike hold in their policymakers. However, if, as Rose-
Ackerman furthers in her work, rampant corruption distorts the viability of the very market 
forces these policies seek to produce, to what degree will they be successful in achieving 
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economic development? Furthermore, if said policies fail to achieve their desired effect, to what 
degree will people lose faith in their government? In the policies themselves? These dire 
consequences cannot and should not be understated; good-natured attempts at economic reform 
without accompanying anti-corruption measures can lead to public resentment and perhaps even 
more concerning, a reversion to the kinds of policies that inhibit growth and encourage cronyism. 
In this sense, corruption acts as spoiler, both hampering the prospects for true development and 
undermining confidence in otherwise fundamentally sound government policies.  
Corruption plays a similar role in limiting the attractiveness of investment. Many 
developing states are keen on attracting foreign direct investment, which can open up growing 
economies to lucrative foreign markets and greater access to capital. FDI is another cornerstone 
of the Washington Consensus, part of the larger movement towards trade liberalization and 
globalization.
48
 Yet, as discussed in the chapter Historical Survey of Business in the Middle 
East: the Role of Globalization, the development paradox, wherein emerging states that 
liberalize their economic policies see associated rises in corruption, affects the efficacy of FDI in 
achieving tangible growth. As Mohsin Habib and Leon Zurawicki discuss in their article 
Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment for the Journal of International Business Studies, 
corruption has a negative impact on foreign direct investment, likely because “foreign investors 
generally avoid corruption because it is considered wrong and it can create operational 
inefficiencies.”
49
 Although Habib and Zurawicki found that corruption might not affect FDI in 
“absolute terms,” with countries like China and others with significant corruption problems, still 
attracting a large amount of FDI, they found a negative relationship between corruption and FDI 
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through more subtle indicators.
50
 More specifically, they examined the difference in corruption 
between home countries and FDI recipient host countries, finding both a negative effect of 
corruption on FDI as well as a reduced likelihood for foreign firms to make investments in 
countries perceived more corrupt than their own.
51
 These findings highlight the degree to which 
corruption can limit the attractiveness of a foreign market to investors from developed 
economies. The consequences can be dire for developing countries, particularly those in the 
Middle East, which don’t have the same cache with international investors as say China or India, 
and are thus more likely lose out on access to capital inflows that might otherwise spark 
economic growth. 
The Habib and Zurawicki study also raises interesting questions as to the very nature of 
firm behavior. That is - do notions of morality affect firm decision making processes? And more 
importantly, do firms factor ethical decision making into financial performance? These questions 
strike at the very heart of corruption’s depressing effect on economic growth. As much 
importance placed on corruption’s relationship with macro level indicators should be applied to 
its impact on the firm level: Are firms more likely to invest, or even improve in performance 
when the business ethics environment is strong rather than weak? Although scholarship is 
admittedly lacking on this issue, a group of Korean business researchers published an article in 
the Journal of Management titled How Does Corporate Ethics Contribute to Firm Performance? 
The Mediating Role of Collective Organizational Commitment and Organizational Behavior, 
looking for links between ethics and firm performance.
52
 By looking at the internal practices and 
financial activities of 130 Korean businesses, they found that strong organizational practices 
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were related to improved financial performance.
53
 This relationship might explain firm behavior 
in the face corruption, as supported by the Habib and Zurawicki study. A hostile business ethics 
environment might not just contradict the firm’s morals, but its ability to maintain strong 
financial performance as well. Implicitly, pervasive corruption can do damage to a firm’s 
internal culture, which might be integral to the firm’s competitive advantage. Unique internal 
cultures are costly for firms to both develop and maintain and as a result, firms might be less 
willing to risk investing in countries with high corruption levels. 
  At the same time, the researchers also note that 
The relationship between firm performance is indirect. In emerging markets such as 
Korea, the firms’ objectives and strategies tend to be directed toward maximizing profit 
and efficiency rather than running business ethically. Given that corporate ethics and 
managerial transparency are deemed less important in developing countries with shorter 
histories of economic development than in developed ones (Blackburn, Bose, & Haque, 
2006), the direct connection between corporate ethics and firm performance might be 
weak in the emerging economy (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000).  
This idea does not necessarily contradict the prior hypothesis. On the contrary, it highlights the 
idea that firms in emerging economies should aspire to the kinds of ethical decision making 
models encouraged in more developed economies.  
Returning to corruption’s impact on a macro-level, Park Hung Mo looked at the overall 
effect of corruption on growth rates in his article Corruption and Economic Growth for the 
Journal of Comparative Economics.
54
 Po argues that corruption cannot be viewed in isolation of 
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its effects on core societal institutions; prior theories that emphasized the ability of corruption to 
speed companies through inefficient and bureaucratic regulatory regimes neglect such effects. 
Through a statistical model that incorporates the impact of corruption on political and investment 
channels, Park found that a 1 percent increase in corruption levels decreases economic growth by 
as much as .72 percent.
55
 Given the wealth of data highlighting corruption’s role in depressing 
economic growth, the results of Park’s statistical analysis are less than surprising, but his study 
raises other interesting issues. For example, he found that “the most important channel through 
which corruption affects economic growth is political instability, which accounts for about 53% 
of the total effect.”
56
 This finding is critical to understanding the impact of corruption on the 
degree to which a local environment is hospitable to business interests, which is of particular 
relevance in the Middle East.  
News headlines across the world constantly highlight the political instability that blankets 
the Middle East and other developing nations, many of which are engulfed in political violence 
and discontent. It is no secret that political instability poses a significant risk to business growth 
and potential; uncertainty about the future can play a major role in discouraging growth and 
investment. A study by Shang-Jin Wei of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government confirms 
this phenomenon by looking at the role corruption induced uncertainty has on FDI, finding that 
“The effect is negative, statistically significant, and quantitatively large. An increase in the 
uncertainty level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico, at the average level of corruption in 
the sample, is equivalent to raising the tax rate on multinational firms by 32 percentage points.”
57
 
The bottom line is that profit-seeking firms will look for ways to manage risk - one way of doing 
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so is by avoiding the uncertainty that certain business lines or markets pose. Corruption that 
undermines faith in political institutions and promotes political instability can seriously hamper 
the attractiveness of doing business, and with the host of political and religious divisions 
plaguing the Middle East, the region has little room for the uncertainty induced by corruption 
constraints. The Wei study also again demonstrates the ways corruption undercuts the policies 
promoted by the Washington Consensus. It suggests that well-meaning policy-makers could do 
all the right things on paper – pro growth regulations, liberalized trade policies, reduced state 
subsidies etc., and still fail to attract large investments. Political stability bolsters both the 
legitimacy of state institutions, as well as the efficacy of government policies. As such, 
policymakers should seek to enact those policies that will support political stability and mitigate 
uncertainty, which will often mean developing strong anti-corruption statutes.  
One way that regimes in developing countries promote political stability is by creating an 
aura of legitimacy, be it through patronage, propaganda, or other methods of state control. 
However, the threat that corruption poses to the legitimacy of state institutions suggests that this 
approach may not be sufficient for controlling uncertainty. A study by University of Pittsburgh 
Professor Mitchell Seligson, which surveyed thousands of residents in four South American 
countries, found that “exposure to corruption erodes belief in the political system and reduces 
interpersonal trust.”
58
 By eroding the trust between the governing and the governed, corruption 
has the effect of delegitimizing pivotal state institutions - the very institutions designed to 
enforce government policy and maintain a semblance of political and economic stability. This is 
especially problematic for more autocratic regimes, which are disproportionately represented in 
the developing world and rely heavily on the use of state power to maintain social order. 
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Corruption creates a disconnect between perceived legitimacy and actual authority; it shifts 
power from central authorities to lower-level bureaucrats who can extract rents from businesses 
and citizens alike. The result is of particular concern to leaders in the developing world, who 
may in fact believe that their authority has greater reach than it does on a practical basis, 
threatening the stability of the ruling class, and thus, creating a chasm of uncertainty that may 
limit the growth and investment potential of local and foreign firms.  
Corruption also has the potential to erode civil society, another pillar of political and 
social stability. Civil society has the power to hold even the most authoritarian leaders 
accountable and acts as a buffer between the state and the citizenry, making its proper 
development essential for transitioning states. In his book Civil Society and Corruption: 
Mobilizing for Reform, Michael Johnston writes, “A look at societies where corruption is under 
control, or is moderate in scope at most, makes it clear that citizen participation, honest 
competitive elections, mechanisms of accountability, and a strong, active civil society are 
essential parts of the anti-corruption package.”
59
 However, corrupt and often times authoritarian 
regimes ensure that “civil society is weak, divided, and intimidated.”
60
 When citizens feel 
disconnected from the political and policy-making process, they are less likely to be invested in 
the future success and growth of the state, highlighting a paradox autocrats encounter when 
repressing civil society. Authoritarian and corrupt leaders seek to keep their piece of the power 
and wealth pie fixed, but at the same time grow the pie in absolute terms. However, given the 
importance of integrated civic participation, growth will be difficult without power sharing 
between the elites and the general citizenry, which means reducing the concentration of political 
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power and wealth. Strong civic participation is ultimately built upon mutual trust between those 
in power and those consenting to the government’s authority, a sort of social contract where the 
citizens contribute their “capital” (tax dollars, community involvement, advocacy, etc) and the 
rulers grow public “assets” through meaningful investments and sound economic and social 
policy. A failure to understand the value of this relationship is a recurring pitfall in the 
developing world, especially so in the Middle East and North Africa, where capturing value from 
economic growth is often seen as a zero-sum game between the elites and the general populace. 
The relatively high rate of political corruption in the Middle East is a strong indicator of this 
phenomenon, highlighting the desire of ruling elites to maintain control over economic and 
social goods.  
The ability of the state to provide safety and security to its constituents is another 
cornerstone of political stability. However, as you might expect, corruption poses a significant 
threat to the state’s ability to meet its obligations in maintaining a peaceful atmosphere 
internally. Sarah Chayes, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
explored the relationship between corruption and security in her book Thieves of the State: Why 
Corruption Threatens Global Security through stories of graft and violence in the developing 
world. One her most poignant stories comes from the long-troubled state of Afghanistan, where 
she describes the plight of a former Afghan policeman who attempted to report Afghan police 
extracting illegal bribes from his friends and family. He was met only with scoffs from the very 
institution he used to serve, leading him to say “If I see someone planting an IED on the road, 
and then I see a police truck coming, I will turn away. I will not warn them.”
61
 This example 
                                                        






highlights the real danger corruption can play in weakening the security situation in fragile 
states. In this case, the former policeman, Nurallah, was a man with great loyalty to the Afghan 
National Police, and yet, his experience with corruption was impactful enough to throw that 
loyalty into question. If corruption can shake even the most loyal state supporters, then what of 
its impact on populations less connected to state institutions or more vulnerable to violent 
extremism? Indeed, corruption seems to have a sharp emotional impact on its victims, both 
undermining the state’s authority and leaving the affected feeling helpless and resentful. In a 
region like the Middle East, where violent extremism poses a major problem to state security, 
there are real concerns that corruption plays into the hands of the very groups that seek to recruit 
members from vulnerable elements in society. Unlike some other imperfections of state structure 
in developing countries, corruption seems to strike its victims on a very personal level, robbing 
them of their dignity and undermining their trust in the very authorities that should be 
guaranteeing that the rule of law prevails. As Sarah Chayes wrote in Thieves of the State, 
“Nurallah’s tale was just the most striking demonstration. Corruption, it made plain, was not 
soley a humanitarian affair, an issue touching on principles or values alone. It was a matter of 
national security--Afghan national security … Acute government corruption may in fact lie at the 
root of some of the world’s most dangerous and disruptive security challenges--among them the 
spread of violent extremism.”
62
 Ignoring the impact of corruption on security misses a crucial 
link to corruption’s negative impact on economic growth. By weakening state security 
institutions, it acts as an additional wildcard in encouraging political instability, which, as 
highlighted in the Park study, accounts for 53% of corruption’s overall impact on economic 
growth. Furthermore, in a region like the Middle East, which needs no help in the political 
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instability department, corruption only expands the serious security threats that remain 
widespread across the region. 
Given the body of evidence across disciplines of economics, social science, political 
economy, and political science, there is strong support with which to conclude that corruption is 
one of the most powerful geopolitical forces in developmental economics. But what of its 
relationship to business ethics and the greater Middle East? Corruption ultimately shapes the 
contours of the business ethics landscape in the Arab world, playing an integral role in forming 
the dynamics between business and political power brokers. Although there are many additional 
characteristics of the region that contribute to its present business challenges (see Chapter 
Ethical Underpinnings), corruption helps to set the “rules of the game,” and concentrates power 
in the region’s elite ruling class.  
Professor Norman Bishara (advisor for this paper) of the University of Michigan 
summarized the role corruption plays in the Middle East in his article Governance and 
Corruption Constraints in the Middle East: Overcoming the Business Ethics Glass Ceiling. In 
doing so, he concludes that widespread corruption and weak legal regimes, among other factors, 
create what has amounted to what he calls a “business ethics glass ceiling,” writing “the scourge 
of corruption, how it drains businesses of capital and reduces trust in government, and the 
problem of inadequate development are connected. This combined set of disincentives ultimately 
stunts enterprise and profit growth and perpetuates an environment ripe for corruption, thus 
leading to the business ethics glass ceiling.”
63
 This idea strikes at the heart of corruption’s effect 
on the business ethics landscape and ultimately, the prospects for growth for regional businesses. 
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Instead of simply slowing or inhibiting growth, the pervasiveness of corruption in the Middle 
East effectively caps the growth potential of businesses, particularly SMEs. 
 In this sense, business ethics should not be viewed as ancillary to economic performance 
in Middle Eastern countries, but instead as an integral part of understanding what is holding it 
back, and more importantly, its role in the region’s future. Bishara’s business ethics glass ceiling 
theory reasserts the important roles legal structure, political factors, and culture play in affecting 
economic growth and as such, they should take center stage in Arab economic reform. Recent 
developments have been less promising, as Arab governments continue to ignore the need for 
fundamental reform in favor of flashy and wanton investments that make a mockery of 
sustainable development. Turning attention towards anti-corruption measures would be far more 
effective in promoting long-term economic growth that expands opportunities for all Arabs and 
not just the well-connected few. By addressing corruption head-on, Middle Eastern governments 
can begin to win back the trust of their constituents, and with an enduring enforcement regime, 
signal their commitment to political stability. Shattering the business ethics glass ceiling will 
require a concerted regional effort, starting with sincere attempts to reverse harrowing trends in 
corruption.  
Corruption in the Middle East and North Africa 
 With this context in mind, we might be better able to understand the role corruption plays 
in the Middle East and relatedly, how the region’s developmental flaws contribute to the weak 
business ethics environment. As highlighted previously, corruption is not necessarily an easy 
factor to measure; there is disagreement as to what it constitutes, and even with a consensus 
definition, available data may be incomplete or misleading (see Defining Corruption: A 
Narrow Construction or a Spectrum?). That being said, some commonly used measures, most 
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notably Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index, are useful for 
comparing the relative corruption levels across regions and nations. 
 The 2016 edition of the Corruption Perceptions Index, published in January 2017, draws 
its methodology by aggregating the assessments of 12 different economic and political analysis 
institutions from around the globe, standardizing the data and assigning a composite score to 
each country.
64
 176 countries were included in the 2016 study, including all of the countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa. The map below summarizes the findings of the study, with 
lighter shaded countries receiving higher composite scores associated with lower levels of 
corruption and the darker shaded countries receiving lower composite scores to reflect higher 
levels of corruption: 
  
 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2016
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 What is most obviously striking is that outside of Western Europe and North America, 
much of the world remains shaded dark to indicate higher associated levels of corruption. 
However, given the relationship between economic output and corruption discussed in The 
Relationship Between Corruption and GDP Per Capita, this result is not so surprising. 
Looking deeper into the results of the study, there emerges clear differences in the relative 
corruption levels between various world regions. The Middle East and North Africa clearly ranks 
among the world’s worst, significantly lagging behind their Western counterparts. According to 
the TI report, “90 percent of [Arab countries] have scored below a 50, which is a failing grade,” 
and that “Five out of the ten most corrupt countries in the world are from the region: Iraq, Libya, 
Sudan, Yemen and Syria. These countries are also inflicted with political instability, war, 
internal conflicts and terrorism, stressing the fact that war and conflict fuel corruption and in 
particular political corruption.”
66
 The impact of said political instability on the region’s 
corruption levels will be discussed in greater detail later on, as it severely limits the ability of 
governments to effectively combat corruption.  
 How does the Middle East compare against other world regions? With a regional average 
of 38, not only does the Middle East receive a failing grade, but it also falls under the world 
average (43), leaving it in the company of sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe, significantly 
below Western Europe, Asia-Pacific, and the Americas.
67
 Furthermore, if you remove outlier 
countries like the UAE and Qatar, which have grades significantly above the regional average, 
but together only constitute 3% of the region’s population, the Middle East average score drops 
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sharply to 33, below Eastern Europe.
68
 It is clear that the Middle East performs poorly across the 
board, but some countries, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon in particular, have 
significantly lower scores than regional and world averages.  
 
All data from Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2016.
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 The Middle East also performs poorly relative to other world regions in surveys 
measuring experience with corruption on a micro level. In a survey of over 125,000 companies 
conducted by the World Bank, over 53% of Middle Eastern companies reported corruption “as a 
major constraint,” a percentage of reporting firms that was significantly higher than any other 
region.
70
 Furthermore, in TI’s report, People & Corruption: Middle East & North Africa Survey 
2016, it states that 63% of survey respondents in the Middle East indicated that they thought 
corruption had increased over the last year and that nearly 1 in 3 respondents reported paying a 
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bribe in the past year, translating to a stunning 50 million people!
71
 These alarming statistics 
seem to demonstrate that reform movements in the region that followed the Arab Spring have 
thus far failed to adequately address concerns about corruption. With anger continuing to boil 
over corruption, it is likely that street demonstrations will continue to challenge political stability 
in throughout the region. However, what is perhaps most concerning about the widespread 
corruption in the region is its sustained impact on investment and the ability to do business.  
 According to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2017 report, the Middle East fared very 
poorly in terms of the ease of starting and operating a business. Middle Eastern countries had an 
average ranking of 116 among 190 countries, highlighting the significant bureaucratic challenges 
Arab entrepreneurs face across the region.
72
 It is highly probable that these hurdles are in some 
way connected to the region’s corrupt political and bureaucratic climate; facing bribes and 
pressure from government officials at every turn, it is not surprising that businesspeople around 
the region voice their frustrations about corruption as a major constraint to the growth of their 
companies.  
 These statistics confirm much of what was theorized about the state of business ethics in 
the Middle East (see Introduction: Historical Survey of Business in the Middle East I and 
II). Disjointed development and ineffectual government policies seem to have left policymakers 
with few options for reform and discouraged companies from making investments or expanding 
within the region. That is not to say that this experience is uniform throughout the Arab world. 
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Although these figures confirm the region’s place among the worst in terms of corruption, they 
also indicate some variation across specific countries and interregional clusters. For this reason, 
it is useful to look at the differences on a sub-regional and country-by-country basis. 
Egypt & North Africa 
 North Africa was the home of the wave of protest and regime change that engulfed the 
Arabic-speaking world in 2011 and yet it continues to lag behind most global standards in 
corruption.  
 
All data from Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2016.
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 However, on a regional basis, the North African countries seem to hover around the 
average CPI for the MENA region as a whole. Furthermore, some differences exist between 
North African countries on the kinds of corruption that are most commonly reported. Political 
instability remains a major constraint in North Africa, with Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya still 
recovering from major regime changes in 2011-2013. There are also some positive trends, 
particularly in Tunisia, which had the lowest percentage of companies identifying corruption as a 
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major constraint among Arab countries surveyed by the World Bank.
74
 Algeria, on the other 
hand, suffers from some of the region’s highest graft rates, with nearly 66% of companies 
reporting the need to provide gifts to public officials to ‘get things done,’ gifts whose value can 
average nearly 5% of the total value of business contracts.
75
 Libya’s low rating is largely due to 
the ongoing civil war that has left the central government ineffective and fragmented between 
rival parties. Meanwhile, Egypt continues to suffer from its notoriously large and corrupt 
bureaucracy, keeping the country below MENA CPI averages despite pledges by President 
Abdel Fateh El-Sisi to shake up the culture of corruption. 
 In many ways, the North African sub-region is microcosm of the greater Middle East’s 
challenges with respect to corruption. It faces political challenges as it seeks to build a new 
political consensus in the wake of the Arab Spring. It faces economic challenges with 
skyrocketing food prices and ballooning youth unemployment. And it faces social challenges 
with respect to rising religious tensions and a growing youth demographic. These political, 
economic, and social trends make it difficult for corruption to be addressed as a matter of policy 
and as a result, North Africa, much like the rest of the Arabic-speaking world, continues to 
flounder behind more developed regions in improving its business ethics environment. Promising 
shifts in Tunisia give hope to what may lie ahead, but at least for now, the future of corruption in 
North Africa remains very much uncertain. 
The Levant 
 The Levant, known as al-Sham in Arabic, includes Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, 
Syria, Jordan, and Iraq and lies in the heart of the Middle East. The sub-region fares poorly when 
compared to the rest of the Middle East.  
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All data from Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2016.
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 There is no question that the region is at a disadvantage due to the widespread prevalence 
of political instability and violence. Syria and Iraq, currently embroiled in violent internal 
conflicts, are severely lacking in the structural infrastructure to combat corruption and in some 
cases, the Iraqi and Syrian governments may be relying on income streams from illegal activities 
to maintain institutional control.  
Despite being one of the few democracies in the Arab world, Lebanon has long suffered 
from an ineffectual and corrupt central government. Frustrations over corruption have led to 
numerous street demonstrations in the last few years, including the famous “You Stink” 
movement that began in 2015. These concerns are further highlighted by survey results from TI’s 
Global Corruption Barometer report, which indicate that an astonishing 92% of Lebanese believe 
that corruption had increased over the past year, 76% see the government as doing badly in the 
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Jordan remains the lone bright spot in the Levant, with a CPI score exceeding both the 
MENA and Levant averages. Furthermore, Jordanians reported the lowest bribery rates among 
countries surveyed in the Global Corruption Barometer report.
78
 These superior metrics may be 
the result of Jordan’s more stable political climate, which stands in stark contrast to the 
Lebanese, Syrian, and Iraqi governments. 
Despite Jordan’s more positive positioning, the Levant remains an exceptionally corrupt 
sub-region in one of the most corrupt regions in the world. Additionally, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, 
and Syria all ranked below the region’s abysmal 116 average in the World Bank’s Doing 
Business 2017 report.
79
 With sprawling bureaucracies, corrupt local officials, and inefficient 
regulatory regimes, Levantine countries are particularly disadvantaged in competing for foreign 
direct investment, while also making internal economic growth a challenge.  
Yemen & The Gulf 
 The Gulf states, funded by consistent oil revenue streams and by far the most prosperous 
Arab nations, dominate the economic activity in the region. According to the United Nations 
Development Programme 2016 Human Development Report, the members of the GCC
80
 had 
some of the highest human development index ratings of any countries in the world, far 
outpacing the rest of the Arab world.
81
 But how does this translate to the Gulf’s place in 
corruption measures?  
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All data from Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2016.
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 All of the Gulf states exceed the MENA average for CPI scores and the Gulf average of 
50.33 is the only sub-region average to receive a passing grade. In fact, of the GCC was included 
as a separate region in the TI Corruption Perceptions Index Report 2016, it would rank second in 
the world behind only Western Europe. The Gulf’s advantage over the rest of the Middle East is 
hardly a surprise given corruption’s well documented relationship with economic growth and 
output, but at the same time presents a harrowing picture for the rest of the region. The Gulf 
states collectively constitute about 13% of the Arab world’s total population, thereby 
disproportionately propping up the region’s average corruption scores.
83
  
 At the same time, it is important to recognize that the ratings given to many of the Gulf 
states also reflect the weaknesses of the CPI measure. All of the GCC countries are ruled by 
monarchies, where wealth and prestige remains concentrated in the hands of a small ruling class. 
With unfettered control over their respective countries’ petroleum resources, there is little room 
for competition from entrepreneurs outside of the ruling royal families. Furthermore, the ruling 
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governments rely on patronage, using their expansive oil wealth to pacify internal opposition. 
Although this system of governance has proved very effective for the GCC countries, it is hardly 
without deficiencies. 
Turning now to Yemen, the country remains an outlier in the Arabian Peninsula. With a 
CPI score of only 14, Yemen ranks among the most corrupt countries in the Middle East, second 
only to Syria. Presently engulfed in an internal conflict, Yemen ranked 168th in the world for 
human development in 2016, the lowest among all Arab states, including Syria.
84
 In 2013, an 
astonishing 97% of Yemeni firms reported corruption as a major constraint. along with high 
bribery and extortion rates.
85
 Yemen has long been the poorest and least developed state in the 
Middle East, and with political strife and corruption continuing to plague the nation, it is unlikely 
to make strides on the economic front in the near future. 
Forms of Corruption in the Middle East 
 Grand Corruption 
 The data provided by the World Bank and Transparency International is useful for 
comparing the relative corruption levels on a regional or country-to-country basis, but does not 
give much color as to what is actually experienced on the ground. In order to understand the 
nature of corruption in the Arab world, it is helpful to look at the prevalence of various types of 
corruption across the region. As discussed in Defining Corruption: A Narrow Construction or 
a Spectrum? TI groups corrupt practices into three buckets: grand corruption, political 
corruption, and petty corruption. Each of these buckets comes with a very different set of social 
and economic consequences, so while the absolute corruption level is certainly important, it is 
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crucial to understand the “corruption mix” to better understand the pervasiveness and impact of 
corruption on the ground. 
 Grand corruption, which typically occurs at the highest levels of government and 
business, includes transactions of such high monetary value that they could even impact the 
proper functioning of the affected economic system.
86
 Despite its potential for harm, some have 
argued that grand corruption has the potential to “grease the wheels” of an economy. For 
example, a classic case of grand corruption might occur when developers or high net worth 
investors pay a bribe to a state official in order to bypass regulatory holdups or procure favorable 
government contracts. The logic behind grand corruption’s “wheel greasing” effect is that it 
encourages economic transactions that would otherwise not occur in its absence. Suppose, for 
example, that absent an opportunity to bypass regulatory obstacles, the potential developer in our 
example would instead invest in another economy on more favorable terms. With the added 
benefit of reduced regulatory costs or more favorable contracts, the investor is instead 
encouraged to pay the bribe and ensure that a deal is secured.  
 However, as Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Khalid Sekkat argue in their article for Public 
Choice, “Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth?” the interaction of grand 
corruption and bureaucratic processes may be far more complicated than initially theorized. They 
write “Starting with the ill functioning of bureaucracy, the positive impact of corruption 
on slowness rests on the assumption that a civil servant can speed up an "exogenously" slow 
process. However, corrupt civil servants may cause delays that would not appear otherwise, just 
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to get the opportunity to extract a bribe.”
87
 In other words, the “grease the wheels” theory 
neglects to consider the impact transactional corruption may have on the proper functioning of 
government, which might reverberate down the bureaucracy. As a result, both foreign investors 
and local businesspeople may find it increasingly difficult to do business; without a trickle-down 
effect to lower strata in the economy can grand corruption really be said to “grease the wheels?”  
In fact, as Méon and Sekkat discuss, grand corruption might actually have an opposite 
“sand the wheels” effect when the quality of governance is low.
88
 In order to test the competing 
“grease the wheels” and “sand the wheels” theories, they developed an econometric model 
drawing on economic growth data and corruption measures like the CPI. Their ensuing 
regression analysis seemed to reject the “grease the wheels” theory, suggesting instead that 
“corruption does not appear as a way to circumvent bad governance, but as a way to make it 
more painful.”
89
 Furthermore, they found that “instead of alleviating the cost of bad governance, 
corruption impedes investment even more in countries whose governance is defective.” The 
results of the results Méon-Sekkat study highlight the danger grand corruption can pose to 
developing economies. Weak and underdeveloped political institutions are ill-equipped to 
counteract the negative side-effects of high-level corruption, which is of particular concern in the 
Middle Eastern context. 
In her article for the Journal of Banking Finance, Susan Rose-Ackerman succinctly 
explains the ‘costs’ of grand corruption:
90
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In short, ‘‘grand’’ corruption can produce serious distortions. The state pays too much for 
large-scale procurements and receives too little from privatizations and the award of 
concessions. Corrupt officials distort public sector choices to generate large rents for 
themselves and to produce inefficient and inequitable public policies. Government 
produces too many of the wrong kind of projects and overspends even on projects that are 
fundamentally sound. Corruption reduces the revenue-raising benefits of privatization 
and the award of concessions. Firms that retain monopoly power through bribery and 
favoritism undermine the efficiency benefits of turning over state firms to private owners. 
Her description of these costs demonstrates the ultimate effect of so-called grand corruption: it 
worsens an already poor business ethics environment.  
 Fortunately, grand corruption tends to be less widespread in the Middle East and North 
Africa. However, a lack of transparency at the highest levels of government make it difficult to 
properly evaluate the pervasiveness of grand transactional corruption. For example, although 
Lebanon’s government remains far more transparent than some of its counterparts, it does not 
disclose or regularly provide audits of publicly owned assets.
91
 This lack of transparency is 
particularly concerning as Middle Eastern states undergo privatization, as has been the general 
trend over the last 20 years. Yet despite the many opportunities for quid pro quo exchanges 
between high-level bureaucrats and private investors, citizens in Arab countries appear to be less 
worried about grand corruption and instead focus their anger on other forms of abuse.  
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Political Corruption  
 Political corruption remains one of the most pervasive challenges to effective governance 
and economic development in the Middle East. Defined in simple terms, political corruption 
refers to an institutionalized set of practices that promote the concentration of power and wealth 
in the hands of an elite ruling class. Compounding the problem is the nature in which it 
manifests: political corruption is exceptionally hard to measure. It is cultivated over generations 
and is more difficult to pinpoint on a case-by-case basis. Its effects, however, are felt and 
understood by all who suffer in its wake. Political corruption is the confluence of concentrated 
control over economic and political capital. When the two are combined, corruption can become 
institutionalized in the very political processes that should act as a counterweight to the specter 
of abuse. Concerns about political corruption are particularly relevant in the developing world, 
where we often see political power used as a tool by autocrats or a select few for personal gain. 
 Political corruption can manifest itself in a myriad of ways, prominent among them 
patronage, nepotism, and extortion. The ultimate impetus behind these tactics is dual factored: 1. 
Maintaining control over public affairs 2. Extracting rents from the affected population. These 
two goals also complement each other. Extended political control can develop constituent 
dependency on a select group of leaders to bring about social and economic benefits, which in 
turn allows said leaders to more easily extract rents from the dependent constituent group. The 
result is a zero-sum relationship wherein the ruling few maintain power at the expense of the 
public good.   
 The Middle East is no exception to the long reaches of political and institutionalized 
corruption. With a long history of dictators, warlords, and royal families, millions of Arabs are 
left without a meaningful political process, subject to the decisions of leaders whose primary 
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purpose is to extend the longevity of their influence. Furthermore, the challenges analysts face 
with respect to measuring political corruption in the region allows the continued abuse of power 
to go relatively unchecked. Marina Ottaway of the Wilson Center explains this phenomenon 
rather aptly:  
The most insidious form of corruption in many MENA countries is rarely recognized in 
the region, although it raises eyebrows elsewhere. This is the exemption of many groups 
and individuals from any form of scrutiny or control. Examples abound. Ruling families 
in Gulf countries control much of the land. They also control the oil revenue, and are 
secretive about its amounts and their use — how much goes into the state budget or is 
invested in sovereign wealth funds, and how much disappears into the hands of the ruling 
families and their clients, sometimes reappearing mysteriously in the financing of 
extremist groups to which nobody admits providing funds. From the point of view of the 
West, this spells corruption. In the region, it is a tradition that many accept as normal, and 
few dare challenge it openly.
92
 
And yet despite the challenges to open criticism of these abuses, the Arabic language is filled 
with colorful descriptors for the many forms of political corruption. For example, Arabs often 
decry Al-Mahsoubiyeh, which refers to the favoritism that is rampant in the hiring process for 
highly coveted public sector positions. There is also the concept of Riahyeh, or patronage, the 
tool of choice for Arab political leaders in pacifying dissent and building political allies. Despite 
the suffocating effect of this political corruption, it is some of these very practices that led to the 
Arab Spring in the first place, which toppled ruling classes in Tunisia and Egypt, many of whose 
members were later discovered to be hoarding billions in illicitly obtained wealth. It is a mistake 
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to say that Arabs are aloof to the activities of their political leaders, but rather that their options 
for combating political corruption short of open revolution are severely limited.  
 As such, frustration with political processes in both Arab democracies and dictatorships 
remains very much widespread. For example, in Transparency International’s Global Corruption 
Barometer 2016 report for the Middle East, huge majorities in most Arab countries reported that 
they believed that at least some of the public sector was tainted by corruption (see figure 
below).
93
 These sentiments were particularly high in Yemen and Lebanon where at least 67% of 




Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer Report 2016
95
 
Noticeably missing from the survey are the Gulf states, which, as discussed earlier, achieve the 
region’s best CPI scores and are associated with lower levels of corruption. However, the control 
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political leaders have over precious natural resources, notably petroleum, makes institutionalized 
corruption an important underreported metric. The difficulty of measuring political corruption 
does not mean that its effects are any less salient. As such, addressing the structural holes that 
create opportunities for political corruption is a major theme in this paper.  
Petty Corruption 
Petty corruption is perhaps the most widespread, and most widely detested, form of 
corruption in the Middle East. This form of corruption refers to low-value transactions like 
bribes, petty extortion, and kickbacks that occur in high volume and affect a wide range of 
individuals and businesses in a society. Despite encapsulating what are often small cash bribes, 
petty corruption is no less dangerous the proper functioning of the public and private sector. In 
fact, because it is felt very vividly by its victims, the emotional impact of petty corruption makes 
it an essential target of reform. Furthermore, petty corruption often affects the poorest, least 
powerful segments of society, forcing them to pay bribes or other fees in exchange for essential 
services. Another critical feature of petty corruption is the ability its perpetrators have to mask its 
presence in the bureaucratic process. This makes it difficult to distinguish illegal activities from 
those that are sanctioned by law. When, for example, does a license fee for starting a business 
become a bribe? The line between petty corruption and costs of governance is often blurred, but 
its presence remains a significant hindrance to the proper functioning of an economy, particularly 
on a micro level. 
Perhaps even more harrowing is the underlying distrust in government that petty 
corruption helps to foster. In their book Corruption and Democratisation, Alan Doig and Robin 
Theobald explain the impact of petty corruption on state legitimacy, writing “countries in which 
petty corruption is pervasive must in addition endure disabling low levels of trust in public 
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institutions, with all the extremely negative consequences for commitment to collective projects, 
civic behavior, levels of crime and public order.”
96
 By undermining the rule of law, petty 
corruption reduces faith in political institutions, which in turn depresses the quality of those very 
institutions. In this sense, petty corruption creates a vicious cycle of sorts, much to the detriment 
of both the governing and the governed.  
As highlighted previously, it is estimated that nearly a third of people living in the Middle 
East paid a bribe in the past year.
97
 These bribes are demanded from a number of different 
officials, including police officers, tax officials, and other bureaucrats. Furthermore, they are 
paid for a variety of services, among them opening a business, obtaining commercial licenses, 
and expediting bureaucratic processes. This results in the uneven distribution of government 
services, leaving winners and losers in the Arab public. Those who can “pay to play” are given 
special treatment while the poor are left at a significant disadvantage. In this sense, petty 
corruption fosters not only resentment of the government, but also between different social 
classes in Arab society.  
Out of all the three buckets of corruption, petty corruption seems to have the most 
tangible and vivid effects on its victims. As a result, it is readily understood and universally 
detested, particularly among middle and lower class Arabs. Given this, it is not a surprise to see 
that corruption was in fact one of the main driving forces behind the Arab Spring. But even more 
so than that, petty corruption, combined with political corruption, and to a lesser extent, grand 
corruption, has pointed impacts on the proper functioning of local markets. The combination of 
institutionalized corruption and lower level abuses make the business environment inhospitable 
to entrepreneurs and continued growth. And what of businesses seeking to chart an ethical course 
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in a pointedly unethical environment? The options are indeed limited, and might explain why 
thousands continue to emigrate from the region every year.  
Effects of Corruption on Business in the Middle East 
 Norman Bishara’s “glass ceiling” theory is particularly apt for explaining the suffocating 




 One rather intriguing phenomenon is 
the relationship between ethical constraints and the so-called SME financing gap, which 
describes the disparity in funding opportunities between large firms and smaller, often family-
owned businesses.
100
 Bishara explains the interplay between the two and how it relates to the 
Middle East context: 
The business ethics glass ceiling is the state of affairs that materializes when internal and 
external factors, particularly those related to corruption, create a situation where a business 
chooses to remain small and to appear unprofitable to avoid being a target for corruption. 
In turn, businesses in this situation appear to be poorly run with little prospect of growth, 
thus creating a financial picture in which they appear to be poor investments. Such 
companies may fail to choose (or are unable to choose because of local laws) corporate 
governance mechanisms with an ethical spillover, mechanisms that embrace transparency 
and accountability as a check on corruption. The glass ceiling develops as a constraint 
because, in reacting to corruption in their surroundings, these SMEs and small and 
medium-sized family firms remain opaque and unable to access financing outside of family 
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trust networks or traditional bank loans. These sorts of barriers to investment have 
collectively been called a SME financing gap.
101
 
In a region where small and medium sized businesses make up a significant proportion of total 
economic activity, the business ethics glass ceiling can put a significant damper on growth. 
Furthermore, the phenomenon is self-reinforcing; If only larger firms with connections in the 
government are able to receive favorable treatment, wealth remains concentrated in the firms 
whose success is seen as a compelling state interest. These barriers to growth can be severely 
discouraging to private entrepreneurs, and place an upper bound on the potential of smaller 
firms. 
Operating under Bishara’s theory, it is clear that a firm’s business ethics ecosystem has a 
profound effect on both its willingness and ability to expand and grow. In a healthy economy, the 
major constraint on growth should come from competition with other firms, but in an 
environment where some firms face asymmetric corruption pressures, the market will be 
distorted in such a way as to undermine the usual incentives for growth.  
The point of this discussion is ultimately to highlight that ethics do in fact matter. The 
ability of a firm to operate unabridged by fears of extortion, bribery, and other forms of abuse is 
often taken for granted in the developed world. However, in the Middle East, corruption and a 
weak business ethics environment are some of the biggest challenges that firms, both small and 
large, face when making decisions about investment and expansion. And yet, despite the 
frustrations that Arab businesses, policymakers, and citizens share with respect to rampant 
corruption, little has been accomplished in making progress to improving the business ethics 
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environment. In fact, despite being one of the most prominent rallying points for activists 
throughout the Arab Spring, corruption may have actually worsened since 2011.
102
 
Given its pervasiveness and profound impact, one might wonder, why has reforming the 
poor business ethics environment not taken greater priority in the greater Middle East? The 
answer lies in a complex web of cultural, political, and structural factors that underpin business 
and trade in the Arab world. There are certain forms of corruption and business practices that 
would otherwise be unacceptable in the developed world that may in fact be cultural norms in the 
Middle East. These norms are the product of hundreds of years of shared experience and history, 
making their reform all the more difficult. Reform efforts are certainly not helped by the political 
environment across the region, which remains tumultuous and subject to bouts of extreme 
instability. Finally, weak enforcement regimes and almost non-existent corporate governance 
standards make private firms particularly susceptible to unethical business practices. In the next 
chapter, we examine the cultural, political, and structural underpinnings of the poor business 
ethics landscape with the objective of identifying important targets for policy reform. This is 
accompanied by a case study on Lebanon, where there is greater access to local press reports and 
government data. By examining the driving factors that contribute to the culture of corruption in 
the region, we might unlock some tangible solutions for private and public players, with the goal 
of improving the long-term business ethics environment in the Arab world.  
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 Up until this point, the majority of our discussion has centered on both the prevalence and 
impact of corruption on business in the Middle East and North Africa. Yet what has not yet been 
explained is the underlying relationship between “the way things are” and the impact of said 
“things.” As discussed in Defining Corruption: A Narrow Construction or a Spectrum?, 
                                                        





notions of business ethics and corruption may in fact vary from region to region, culture to 
culture. This is certainly in the case in the Arab world: culture colors many of the region’s 
characteristics, from religious practices to forms of government. Business is no exception to the 
reaches of culture, which helps define the contours of firm goals as well as the acceptable 
business practices in the pursuit of such goals.  
The Role of Islam in Arab Business Culture 
Arab culture is fiercely mercantile, the centuries old role of the Arab world as the 
gateway to the Silk Road ingrained in the fabric of Middle Eastern business culture. One surely 
cannot escape the seemingly endless line of shops and businesses that line the bustling streets of 
cities like Beirut and Amman, abuzz from dawn until dusk. On the surface, this competitive, 
profit-seeking business culture appears to come in direct conflict with Islamic derisions of greed 
and worldly accumulation.
104
 In fact, German sociologist Max Weber once wrote of Islam’s 
attitude towards capitalism, namely that it “is inherently contemptuous of bourgeois-commercial 
utilitarianism and considers it as sordid greediness and as the life force specifically hostile to 
it.”
105
 Yet there is doubt as to whether such theories about the relationship between the profit 
motive and Islamic values are as applicable in practice. Others, for example, argue that Islam has 
adapted to the values and practices of the cultures to which it has spread, essentially deferring 
matters of business ethics to the traditions of culture.
106
 A more likely, happy medium bridges 
these two schools of thought. While Islamic values indeed point towards a more egalitarian 
economic system, they do not explicitly condemn or even discourage profit-seeking behavior. 
                                                        
104 The Qur’an explicitly discusses business and profit, setting rules for halal business practices vs 
forbidden or haram ones. Many interpret Qur’an 2:275, for example, as prohibiting financing by 
way of interest, a cornerstone of modern economics.  
105 Turner, B. (1974). Islam, Capitalism and the Weber Theses. The British Journal of Sociology, 
25(2), 230-243. doi:10.2307/589314 
106 Adas, E. B. (2006). The making of entrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic spirit of capitalism 1. 
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The Prophet Muhammad was himself a merchant, like many of his contemporaries in early Arab 
society. It indeed appears that Islam has come to coexist with, rather than dominate Arab culture, 
leaving room for a tension between faith and the practical considerations of life in the modern 
world. Arabs are very much engaged in the global market and a great many of Arab banks and 
financial institutions continue to finance lending by way of compound interest, despite its 
apparent conflicts with Islam.
107
  At the same time, the experience for foreign investors and local 
entrepreneurs certainly varies within the Middle East itself as well. The process for financing a 
real estate development in Lebanon, for example, would appear almost completely foreign to an 
investor obtaining financing from a shariah compliant bank in Saudi Arabia.
108
 It is an easy trap 
to ascribe features of modern day Middle Eastern culture to a monolithic, unchanging body of 
Islamic values, but doing so ignores the great diversity of practices and practitioners in the 
region. Islam, as the predominant religion among Arabs, remains a critical part in the personal 
and professional lives of the Arab people, but its relationship to commerce and trade is less than 
concrete. Ultimately, the role of Islam in Arab business culture is to set a basic standard of ethics 
that firms are expected to respect, but it leaves far more open questions than it answers. 
An Arab Business Culture Ethic?  
Given this, is it possible to describe a standard “Arab business culture” without resorting 
to harmful stereotypes that do little to explain what daily interactions in the Arab marketplace 
actually look like? In my opinion, even attempting to do so misses the point of studying culture 
in the business context. Instead, the focus should be centered on how Arab cultural norms inform 
the practice of commerce in the region. In truth, there is no uniform “Arab business culture,” but 
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there are features of modern Arab society that help place the decisions of individuals, firms, and 
government officials in an important context. Arab-owned firms, for example, might have 
different notions of what success looks like when compared to their American counterparts. 
These notions are ultimately steeped in the cultural norms that underpin Arab society and 
understanding these norms could be useful in targeting reform efforts. As such, in the next few 
subsections, I will discuss some features of the way Arab society is organized that may 
contribute to the poor business ethics landscape in the region.  
Wasta: Friendly Intercession or Conduit of Abuse? 
 Arab society is structured largely around its most basic and important social unit: the 
family. Tied into what constitutes family in the Arab world are notions of honor and respect, 
burdening its members to act as agents of the family as a whole. Furthermore, one’s social status 
is tied almost directly to the reputation and history of their familial or tribal lineage. As a result, 
the actions of any single individual in the family unit, be they a brother or even a distant cousin, 
affect the social standing of the entire family.
109
 Individuals in the family unit thus share in the 
successes of their kin, but also stand to share in their failures as well.  
This dynamic creates an inherent social contract in the Arab family structure. Each 
member of the family is incentivized to see that their brethren succeed, so when one a family 
member calls on another for help, it is expected that the requested member offer unabridged 
assistance. This extends to requests for even high-value financial assistance, among other time or 
capital intensive efforts. With one’s identity so tied-up in the success of their familial unit, 
requests that may seem inappropriate or taboo in other cultures can appear completely normal in 
the Arab world. Additionally, these bonds often transfer into non-blood relationships, like close 
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friendships, or in-laws. The result is a built in support system: friends and family are prepared to 
expend their social capital with the expectation that they will receive assistance should they so 
need it. 
At first glance, this social structure does not seem too different to other cultures, even 
those in Western societies, but its uniqueness lies in how far it is ingrained in society, impacting 
the way even politics and business are conducted. The spillover of familial intercession into 
broader society is known in the region as, wasta, the centuries old phenomenon steeped in the 
tribal origins of Arab society.
110
 Individuals rely on wasta to obtain that which they could 
otherwise not obtain on their own or through formal processes. In a wasta transaction, an 
individual goes to an intermediary or wasita who then uses their influence or position to fulfil the 
ask of the requestor. The wasita is often a family member or close friend in a position of 
influence in government or the private sector. This extends to an almost infinite variety of 
services, including speeding government processes, obtaining a prestigious job, avoiding a fine, 
or securing a government grant. Wasta might be compared to guanxi in China, which operates on 
a similar understanding of social favors, but, as China has recognized the importance of 
conforming to international standards, guanxi has gradually been addressed through a greater 
focus on the rule of law.
111
 This stands in contrast with the Middle Eastern context, where wasta 
still appears to trump existing laws and regulations.
112
 Although wasta transactions can often 
appear relatively benign, it is clear that they can open avenues for abuse. 
 
 
                                                        
110 Wasta is derived from the Arabic root “w - s - t,” which means “middle” or “connection.” In 
formal Arabic, wasta is vocalized as wasita, meaning “mediator” or “intermediary” 
111 Hutchings, K., & Weir, D. (2006). Guanxi and wasta: A comparison. Thunderbird International 
Business Review, 48(1), 141-156. 
112 Ibid. 148.  
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A Simple Wasta Transaction 
 
 
It might be helpful to illustrate wasta through a simple example: A woman in seeking to 
introduce frozen yogurt to a lucky Middle Eastern town needs to wait 90 days for the 
government to approve her business license application. However, the woman discovers that a 
friend coincidentally came upon the same idea and submitted his business license application 
around the same time as her. Wanting to be the first mover in the market, the woman calls upon 
her uncle, who works in the city’s municipal government, explaining her situation. Acting as a 
wasita, the uncle moves his niece’s license application to the top of list, and her application is 
approved in 7 days.  
Although this story would almost certainly constitute an unacceptable and illegal act in 
Western countries, others like this are commonplace in the Middle East. That is not to say that 
such favors do not breed resentment in the Arab world, but, as Robert Cunningham and Yasin 
Sarayrah explain in their book Wasta: The Hidden Force in Middle Eastern Society, the nature of 
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wasta perpetuates its continued existence: “Wasta as intercession or advocacy to obtain a benefit 
or to speed one’s paperwork gets a mixed reception. People resent others receiving favors to 
which they cannot obtain access, but they extend and receive wasta intercessory services 
themselves.”
113
 Furthermore, since receivers of wasta services are expected to reciprocate when 
called upon, wasta creates a built-in quid pro quo mechanism that makes its saliency in Arab 
society all the more strong. With this in mind, it is clear that wasta has a profound impact on the 
nature of business in government in the region. It is a prominent example of where culture meets 
practical application, and understanding the interplay of family-centric values in the region is 
critical to designing effective reform plans. 
How might wasta impact the contours of business in the Middle East? One hypothesis is 
that it might result in the inefficient matching of capital across the regional economy. This 
“capital mismatch” stems from the priority of familial and kinship connections over what might 
be more economically efficient outcomes. For example, a government agency might contract 
with a more expensive, less efficient firm due to a family connection between a bureaucrat and a 
firm partner, skipping over options that might provide greater economic and social benefits. In 
Arab economies that feature heavy state involvement, this dynamic might have a significant 
impact on the economy, creating an additional, unnecessary cost to taxpayers. To illustrate this, 
we can imagine a firm securing a contract with the government to develop a real estate project in 
a Middle Eastern city. Imagine further that the firm secured the contract on the basis of a wasta 
connection in the government and that more efficient developers were available for contract. In 
this case, an additional cost is created from the subsequent inefficient use of tax revenue, where 
the firm is passing off an additional social cost onto taxpayers (see diagram). This results in a 
                                                        




cost beyond the transaction, as the price paid by the government increases and an inefficient 
economic outcome is created.  
Furthermore, the presence of wasta might slow the growth of entrepreneurial ventures. 
With the emphasis on kinship connections, start-ups with partners who are not well-connected 
might be limited in their options for funding. Absent the emphasis on wasta connections, firms 
would compete on an equal playing field when seeking funding or complying with government 
regulations. Wasta distorts the normal competitive forces that would drive a vibrant economy, 
giving more credence to luck than the sweat of brow.  
Family ties also play an important role in shaping the form and activities of government 
in the Middle East. A healthy and properly functioning government is critical to the development 
of the economy, but achieving a strong bureaucracy requires individuals in public service 
committed the collected good. Arab culture indeed bends towards a community-oriented and 
collective society, but the scale of “community” is defined in a limited sense. More specifically, 
Arabs are often motivated to support those in their kin, which can sometimes be in conflict with 
what is best for society as a whole. Cunningham and Sarayrah explain how wasta degrades the 
effectiveness of state institutions: 
The family remains triumphant, and universal values do not pervade the bureaucracy. 
Those who would challenge the primacy of family loyalty are scorned or crushed. The 
ambivalence and paradox appropriate for a development frame of mind are trodden down 
by family group-think. Bureaucratic universalism or individualism has yet to gain a 
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Cunningham and Sarayrah’s conclusion is critical to understanding the powerful impact that this 
“hidden hand” has on Arab society. Bureaucrats and firms are often making decisions about what 
is best for their kin, rather than what is best for the public or for the firm.  
 What makes wasta important in the business ethics discipline? First and foremost, it helps 
place Arab business culture in a comparative context. Wasta norms that are widely accepted in 
the Middle East might be considered highly unethical in Western countries, and sometimes even 
illegal. What some may deride as blatant corruption, others may see as a familial obligation. 
Nonetheless, wasta does play a major role in contributing to the less than stellar business ethics 
environment. Although rooted in virtuous values of family and generosity, its application is 
better suited to the simpler times of the past, where life was indeed centered on family and small 
communities. In the modern area, the wasta system represents an obstacle to sustained 
development and thus, reform efforts must target its long reach.  
Organizational Theory of Management in Practice 
 Beyond the impact of the wasta system, it is also useful to look at how basic features of 
Arab culture might affect the way business is conducted, even if it has limited connection to 
business ethics. The theory is that by doing so, one might be better equipped to both develop 
reform and convince its intended targets of the utility in making changes in the way business is 
done. Broadly speaking, Arabs place a high emphasis on hospitality and personal relationships 
whether in a formal or informal context. As a result, business often blurs the line between 
professional and personal life in the Middle East. The owner of a shop will likely become very 
well acquainted with the family life of his or her employees and vice versa. This dynamic is not 
at all considered an intrusion into one’s private life, but rather as a development to be 
discouraged, a natural part of doing business. As discussed earlier, individual identity in the Arab 
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world is closely connected with familial honor and reputation. Thus, the mixing of personal and 
professional spheres is an important way individuals present themselves to others, as well as a 
critical way they learn about others.  
 As a result, meetings might be held at someone’s home over dinner, rather than in a 
conference room. It also follows that charisma and sociability are especially valued traits in the 
business world. In a sense, a business models the foundational social unit in Arab society: the 
family. With this in mind, employees are expected to both interact with one another and enjoy 
each other’s company. This close knit business culture might be entirely foreign to an outsider, 
but completely acceptable in the Arab world.  
 This dynamic was elucidated by a study by Priyan Khakhar and Hussain Gulzar Rammal 
in their article for the International Business Review titled, Culture and business networks: 
International business negotiations with Arab managers. Through interviews with Lebanese 
business managers, they hoped to discover some common traits that might explain tendencies of 
Arab negotiators. They wrote the following about their analysis of the interviews: 
The interviews also revealed that in order to foster trust during the negotiations, the Arab 
managers spent a considerable amount of time during the pre-negotiation stage 
communicating information between the parties to create a somewhat informal 
‘atmosphere’ before beginning the actual negotiations. A number of the interviewees 
explained that in an attempt to create trust between the parties at some personal level and 
to foster long-term relationships, the Arab managers even invited foreign negotiators to 
their private residences for an informal dinner before the negotiations commenced. The 
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managers believe that by creating a personal relationship, the parties would be able to 
negotiate in a cordial and trusting environment.
115
 
This analysis confirms the personal nature through which business is conducted in the Middle 
East, whether in the context of negotiations or day-to-day operations.  
Arab culture is predicated on the honor and good faith of its constituent members and this 
bleeds into the world of trade and commerce. This makes reneging on a contract or committing 
business fraud particularly detested in Arab society. When one develops a reputation for being 
untrustworthy in matters of business, it becomes difficult for that person to rehabilitate their 
image. This cultural force has the impact of improving business ethics in the region and can play 
an important role in designing comprehensive reform.  
It is also helpful to examine what constitutes “corporate culture” in the Arab world. 
Although small and medium sized businesses indeed take on larger significance in the Middle 
East, larger firms may have a significant impact on the way business is conducted in the region. 
Corporate culture can be thought of as a normative structure through which firms can generate a 
uniform experience among its employees, in effect influencing their decision making.
116
 This 
occurs through the process of socialization, which refers to “the process of being made a member 
of a group, learning the ropes, and being taught how one must communicate and interact to get 
things done.”
117
 The “getting to know you” nature of Arab business culture is an important part 
of the socialization process, but ultimately does little to explain what corporate culture looks like 
on a hierarchical level.  
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Jamil Hammoud published an article in the International Journal of Business and Social 
Science describing what he calls the “Consultative Authority Decision Making” model (CADM) 
as the “cornerstone of Arab culture and corporate culture.”
118
 He writes that CADM is largely the 
product of the family-oriented structure of Arab society, often centered around a male authority 
figure: 
 CADM can be defined as an informal top down hierarchal decision making process in 
which male leaders at the top, who retain relatively unquestionable authority, make 
decisions after consultations that range from appearance of to resemblance of 
participation. The lower one goes in the hierarchy, the less meaning consultations take 
and in most cases they are non-binding. Although, in social settings consultations are 
relatively more binding due to the consensual nature of submission to the leader who in 
turn cares to build and reflect consensus, managerial authority and ownership of 
economic resources in the context of business organizations render consultations less 
binding especially at lower levels of the organization.
119
 
The CADM model of corporate culture highlights a consistent paradox in the cultural framework 
of Arab businesses. While firms indeed seek a family-oriented cultural dynamic, they also model 
after the authoritative, male dominated ethos that characterize Arab society. This strict 
hierarchical structure may leave businesses more susceptible to the reaches of corruption or at 
the very least in ignorance of important issues in business ethics. 
This is accompanied by a reduced emphasis on outside stakeholders: the firm is seen as 
acting in a social and political vacuum. The business is treated as a community, but the business 
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itself is not community-centric. Although the idea of a “triple bottom line”and stakeholder 
management is relatively new in Western circles, the idea that business should consider social 
issues in the decision making process is particularly foreign to Middle Eastern firms. This of 
course, is with the caveat that firms in the Middle East are significantly smaller and face a 
different set of constraints (see Corruption in the Middle East and North Africa). 
Furthermore, it does not mean that Arab businesses will not be receptive to a community-centric 
model of the business, in fact, Arab ethical norms might actually make introducing this model a 
success (see Private Sector Responsibility and the Role of Firms). However, at present, Arab 
business culture is not particularly conducive to an ethical environment. Without significant 
changes to the way business is conducted on a day-to-day and strategic level, the region is 
unlikely to improve its business ethics landscape.  
Violence, Instability, and Repression: Business & the Politics of War 
 
The rubble of a destroyed building near Sanaa in Yemen.120 
                                                        





 One would be remiss not to recognize the important role that the Middle East’s political 
environment plays in the way business is conducted across the region. Businesses and 
entrepreneurs do not operate in a political or social vacuum. They must respond to emerging 
threats on both a macro and micro scale in order to stay ahead of what may come next. There are 
fundamental levers that a business can control, but being prepared for what is out of their control 
can be just as important for their long-term viability and success. An adequate strategy for 
addressing risk factors is a pivotal part of any business and that is no exception in the Middle 
Eastern context. It just so happens that in the Middle East, political risks dominate the concerns 
of businesses both large and small. It is not an obscure fact that the Arab world has been and 
continues to be the site of some of the world’s most violent conflicts. Furthermore, Arab citizens 
and businesses must contend with the specter of political instability, the region still reeling from 
a wave of revolutions that toppled several long-standing regimes. A third significant political 
concern is the suffocating repression of free speech and individual rights across the region, 
which has pointed consequences for business as well. In the next few subsections, we examine 
the impact of each of these political factors on business in the Middle East and ultimately, how 
these factors contribute to the deterioration of business ethics in the region. 
Mortars and Management: War in the Business Sphere 
 The most obvious impact of war and violence on businesses is the physical threats they 
pose. Modern weaponry has placed incredibly destructive power in the hands of both state and 
non-state actors alike, resulting in the wholesale destruction of neighborhoods, towns, and even 
major cities. Photographs coming out of cities like Aleppo in Syria portray scenes of unthinkable 
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devastation, with formerly tree-lined streets transformed into ash and ruins.
121
 The same is true 
of Yemen, which has seen its major cities, Sanaa and Aden, become the site of craters from 
airstrikes and mortars since the Yemeni Civil War began in 2014. Iraq also continues to recover 
from the damage incurred during the Iraq War and subsequent internal strife.
122
 These conflicts 
have inflicted a significant physical toll on the infrastructure of their respective countries, 
making the efficient delivery of goods and services almost impossible. Beyond damage to 
infrastructure, countless private enterprises have been physically destroyed or rendered 
inoperable as a result of violent conflict. Still, despite the enormous risks they face, many choose 
to continue running businesses in close proximity to violent conflict. In Damascus and Baghdad, 
for example, where the security situation is more stable relative to their more violent 
surroundings, business continues to operate as usual. The dangers they face are very real and yet 
every day, thousands of small and family-owned businesses open their doors to customers across 
the Middle East. In some ways, this is a testament to the upstart, hardworking business work 
ethic in the Arab world, but the more likely answer is that these business owners do so because 
they must.  
An additional impact of these violent conflicts is the potential for a spillover effect. 
Although the region is not well integrated politically, many Arab countries have important 
bilateral relationships with one another that heighten the interconnectedness of their economies. 
This means that when one country in the region erupts into violent conflict, its neighbors and 
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other regional partners are likely to experience shocks to their own internal stability. For 
example, Lebanon, which has significant political, cultural and economic ties to Syria, has been 
mired in political and economic turmoil since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 (see Case 
Study: Lebanon in the Shadow of Syria). The point of this discussion is to illustrate that what 
happens in one country does not stay contained in that country, but rather, it can have 
reverberating effects on the entire region, along with associated impacts on the business 
environment.  
The violent struggle for significant swaths of the Levant, among other conflicts is 
accompanied by the ever looming threat of terrorism. Terrorism has afflicted almost the entire 
Arab world, putting a damper on tourism and making daily life a challenge for its inhabitants. 
For example, the rise of Islamic State (IS) inspired terror attacks across a spate of Middle Eastern 
countries, notably Egypt and Tunisia, have cost them millions of dollars in tourism revenue, 
which make up significant shares of their respective GDPs.
123
 This of course, is nothing to say of 
the psychological impact of terrorism on the countries in which it is prevalent. It is well 
documented that terrorists seek to carry out attacks on targets they believe will inflict the highest 
number of casualties. Not surprisingly, this makes retail and business districts major targets for 
international terrorists.
124
 There is no question that these attacks have a psychological impact on 
both the willingness of customers to frequent small retail shops and the willingness of shop 
owners to operate in the face of such threats. A single attack can have effects on the local market 
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that linger for a lengthy period of time, making terrorism another significant political risk that 
businesses face in the region.  
The threat of terrorism, coupled with proximity to violent conflict ultimately has a 
significant impact on the shape and activities of businesses in the Middle East. There is no 
question that security issues remain at the forefront of manager’s concerns when making 
business decisions. Might they, for example, be less inclined to make major investments or 
expand operations due to fear from these risks? It is also prudent to question why an entrepreneur 
would risk his or her capital when facing the specter of a catastrophic outcome? In this sense, the 
security threats in the region may have a significant depressing effect on the willingness of 
investors or business owners to take on additional risk. It is a well-established principle in 
economics and finance that taking additional risks is correlated with increased, but not 
guaranteed returns. However, with political risk being of the particularly volatile variety, 
businesses are simply less willing to face catastrophic loss for the prospect of marginal gains.  
This has the ultimate consequence of reducing overall economic activity and placing an upper 
bound on the growth potential of firms, particularly those in proximity to violent conflict or those 
operating in regions that are susceptible to terrorist attacks. This puts many Middle East business 
decision-makers at a particular disadvantage when compared to their counterparts outside the 
region, or in parts of the region less prone to violence (i.e. the GCC). But what of the impact of 
war and violence on the business ethics landscape of the region? Through the following case 
study of Lebanon and its relationship to the neighboring civil war in Syria, we might better 





Case Study: Lebanon in the Shadow of Syria 
 Lebanon, a small Mediterranean country of only 4 million, has been a flashpoint for 
conflict throughout much of its short history. Despite having a total area smaller than 
Connecticut, the country is home to dozens of religious and ethnic groups, which self-segregate 
into different parts of the country, although the capital, Beirut, features many different sects 
living in close proximity with one another.
125
 Chief among such groups are the Maronite 
Christians, Greek Orthodox Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shi’ite Muslims, and Druze. In order to 
divide power amongst the main religious groups, the Lebanese Constitution stipulates a 
confessionalist parliamentary democracy in which the President must be a Maronite Christian, 
the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shi’ite Muslim. This, 
however, did not stop the country from plunging into civil war in 1975, which ended in 1990 
after the signing of the Taif Agreement, but not before leaving more than 100,000 killed and 
much of the country destroyed.
126
 In the immediate post-war period, Lebanese businessman 
Rafic al-Hariri assumed the the premiership and set about reconstructing the bombed out streets 
of Beirut, which had been a major tourist and business hub prior to the war. In order to do so, 
Hariri and his allies pushed for the passage of Law 117 in 1991, which created a private 
company comprised of public and private ownership that would coordinate the redevelopment of 
Beirut’s severely damaged Beirut Central District (BCD).
127
 The company, named Solidere, was 
given tremendous power to transfer private property into its coffers, and whether or not this 
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process was voluntary remains dubious.
128
 Since its creation, Solidere has been mired in 
accusations of corruption, bribery, and abuse, aimed particularly at its shareholders, who gained 
enormous wealth as downtown Beirut began to flourish in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Nonetheless, Solidere’s work was allowed to continue relatively unaccounted throughout 
Lebanon’s post-war reconstruction period and today remains the most important development 
company in Beirut, despite the increased involvement of other firms, namely from the Gulf. The 
government’s redevelopment efforts have not been without its detractors, however, as Solidere 
remains in the crosshairs of protestors and reformers.  
 




This example highlights the impact of war and violence on business ethics in a clear way. 
The economic and political vacuum left in the wake of the Lebanese Civil War led to the 
dominance of a concentrated group of firms and investors in what was a previously diversified 
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central business district. Privately owned enterprises were left at a significant disadvantage when 
trying to compete with businesses that had state backing. Furthermore, Solidere’s tight control 
over downtown Beirut encouraged a culture of graft and abuse that permeated throughout 
Lebanon’s businesses. It is true that a heavy handed approach was needed to rebuild the city after 
years of damage and decay and that the private-public partnerships that carried out Rafic Hariri’s 
vision indeed brought about tremendous economic benefits to Beirut and Lebanon as a whole, 
but it came at the cost of depressing the country’s business ethics environment.  
 Of course this development is only a part of what explains the ethics landscape in 
Lebanon in the present day. The Syrian Civil War has had a profound impact on the Lebanese 
economy, and consequently, its businesses. Lebanon has long had strong cultural, political, and 
economic bonds with its neighboring Syria. In fact, prior to 1920, there was little conception of 
“Lebanon” as an individual state with its own territorial boundaries.
130
 Beirut and its neighboring 
cities were considered a part of al-Sham, meaning Greater Syria or the Levant, but the Ottomans 
referred to the Christian dominated area west of Damascus as Jabal Lubnan or Mount 
Lebanon
131
 Furthermore, it was not until Lebanon gained independence from French rule in 1943 
that the Lebanese state assumed its modern form. With this in mind, there are a lot of similarities 
between Lebanese and Syrian culture, but important differences remain. For one thing, the 
influence of Lebanon’s historical Christian majority sets it apart from mainland Syria, which has 
been a majority Muslim state since the advent of Islam many centuries ago.
132
 Furthermore, 
Lebanon has had a much stronger tradition of democracy and representative rule, while Syria has 
been ruled by autocratic governments throughout much of its history.  
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 The Lebanese-Syrian connection was only heightened during the Lebanese Civil War, 
when Syrian troops intervened and remained in the country until 2005.
133
 This was accompanied 
by heavy Syrian influence in Lebanese politics; major actions could not be taken by the 
Lebanese government without approval from Damascus. Thus, when Syria became engulfed in 
its own civil war and the Syrian government could no longer maintain its grip on the Lebanese 
government, the country was thrust into political turmoil. Coalitions that were pro and anti-
Syrian drew sharp lines in the sand, leading to divisions particularly between pro-rebel Sunni 
Muslims and pro-Damascus Shi’ite Muslims. The resulting political paralysis even kept the 
Lebanese Presidency vacant for more than two years, denying Lebanese Christians a key voice in 
government until Michel Aoun took power in October 2016.
134
 Furthermore, an increase in the 
frequency and severity of terrorist attacks, the majority of which were related to the conflict in 
Syria, shook Lebanese society, particularly from 2013 to 2015.
135
 To make matters worse, prior 
to the start of the war, Syria was Lebanon’s fifth largest export partner, and as a direct result of 
the conflict, it is estimated that a Lebanese exporter of goods to Syria lost $90,000 by 2012.
136
 
Most concerning for Lebanon, however, is the dramatic influx of Syrian refugees into the 
country. Recent estimates have the number of Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon at over 1.5 
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 As a result, nearly 1 out of 4 people living in the country is a refugee, the vast 
majority of which are from Syria.
138
 The refugee crisis puts tremendous pressure on the 
Lebanese economy while also fanning the flames of the country’s political paralysis. With state 
resources strained to help manage the flow of refugees, the Lebanese government’s authority and 
effectiveness has been significantly weakened, particularly in areas that border Syria.
139
 The 
result has been the degradation in the quality of state institutions across the country, and with it a 
weakening of the rule of law.  
 These developments paint a pretty bleak picture for Lebanon and its still developing 
economy. However, despite the tremendous pressures the Syrian Civil War brought upon 
Lebanon, the country has managed to stay together, albeit tenuously. But what of the conflict’s 
impact on Lebanon’s business ethics environment? All of the previously described developments 
have essentially degraded the anti-corruption and anti-black market trade enforcement 
mechanisms in the country. This process has been accompanied by a worsening of the country’s 
business ethics environment. For instance, Beiruti activists and entrepreneurs have been 
complaining about a rise in the overall levels of corruption in the country, including widespread 
concern about bribery.
140
 In fact, concerns over the government’s failure to handle a garbage 
collection crisis in 2015 morphed into anti-corruption protests in what became known as the 
“You Stink” movement, highlighting rising frustrations with the rampant corruption. As a result 
the new Lebanese President Michel Aoun and Prime Minister Saad Hariri created the post, 
                                                        
137 Lebanon: Syria Crisis. (2017). European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. 
138 Ibid. 2.  
139 One area of particular concern is the Bek’aa Valley, a region east of Beirut that borders Syria. 
Prior to the start of the war, the Lebanese government had only marginal control over local security 
concerns; the conflict in Syria has only further weakened the central government’s influence in the 
region.   





Minister of State for Combatting Corruption in order to better focus anti-corruption efforts in the 
wake of the Syrian conflict.
141
 Despite these efforts, however, little has been accomplished in the 
way of reducing the higher levels of bribery, extortion, and graft experienced since the start of 
the war in 2011. This has led to continued street protests against government inaction, further 
contributing to the political tensions that gridlock the Lebanese parliament.
142
  
 In addition to the rise in corruption, the Syrian Civil War’s impact on Lebanese 
institutions has also opened the door to growth in the black market. For example, as Lebanese 
security forces are stretched thin with a focus on protecting Lebanon from terror threats, the 
illegal hashish (cannabis drug) trade has grown dramatically.
143
 Concentrated in the Bekaa 
Valley, hashish farmers have been able to escape close scrutiny in by the Lebanese government. 
The rise of the hashish trade and the failure of the government to challenge its growth has led to 
a fall in the confidence the Lebanese people have in their government. This dynamic might have 
a domino effect: if other illicit traders believe that they can escape punishment, as in the case of 
the hashish farmers, it is likely they will only increase the frequency and volume of their illegal 
transactions. Furthermore, with millions of Syrian refugees relatively unaccounted for, it is likely 
that businesses are exploiting their cheap labor for nefarious purposes.
144
 Cheap inputs and weak 
government oversight reduce the barriers to entry in the black market, thus incentivizing growth 
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in illicit exchanges. As such, it is no surprise that Lebanon’s underground market has increased 
in size and scope since 2011.  
With increasing corruption and reduced accountability for unethical business practices, 
the Lebanese business ethics landscape has been significantly worsened since the start of the 
Syrian conflict. In many ways, the Lebanese case is exemplary of what is seen across the Arab 
world. The near constant political and economic pressures of conflict are felt far and wide in the 
region, weakening the strength of government institutions and promoting the growth of illegal 
businesses. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of recognizing that businesses indeed do 
not operate in a political or social vacuum: forces out of their control affect their structure, 
strategy, and day-to-day decision making. This case is also helpful for placing the corruption in 
the Middle East in an important context. Arab businesses are not facing the same constraints in 
North America, Europe, or Asia for that matter - they are constantly contending with the risk of 
violence, political instability, and repression. These factors play a major rule in forming the 
contours of business culture, and ultimately, the acceptable business practices in the region.  
A Note on Political Instability and Repression 
 In addition to violence and conflict, the Middle East is no stranger to political instability 
and abrupt regime changes. The Arab Spring, for example, brought upon some of the most 
tumultuous changes to Middle Eastern governments and yet, few predicted its rise.
145
 With this 
in mind, we would be remiss not to mention the impact of political instability on the behavior of 
firms, as this would give insight into what is driving the poor business ethics landscape in the 
region.  The impact of political instability on economic development has been well covered in 
academic scholarship (see Corruption as a Constraint to Growth, Stability, and Security), 
                                                        
145 Goodwin, J. (2011). Why we were surprised (again) by the Arab Spring. Swiss Political Science 
Review, 17(4), 452-456. 
Habhab 85 
 
but what of its impact on individual firms? In his article for Third World Quarterly, Jedrzej 
George Frynas discusses the relationship between political instability in Nigeria and Shell’s 
operations in the country. In doing so, he argues that in Shell’s case, political instability might 
actually be conducive to business.
146
 Specifically, Frynas points to an internal memo from Shell 
that heralded Nigeria’s weak ‘absorptive capacity,’ the idea that rampant corruption and 
underdeveloped political institutions could limit the state’s ability to capture oil revenues (to the 
benefit of Shell).
147
 Although in this example the affected firm indeed stands to gain from 
political instability, it highlights an area in which instability could affect the ethical 
considerations of an individual firm. In this case, the proper incentives are misaligned: firm 
success and economic development should go hand-in-hand. Political instability might remove 
an inherent sense of duty for firms to be positive role players in their host economy. In the 
Middle East, where political instability remains a major risk factor for businesses of all sizes and 
scopes, this phenomenon is particularly magnified. 
 Another political consideration that impacts business ethics in the Middle East is the 
widespread repression of political freedoms, namely free speech and freedom of the press. The 
Middle East and North Africa consistently ranks the worst in the world with respect to political 
freedoms and respect for human rights: In Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2017 report, 
only one country, Tunisia, was categorized as “free,” and three countries, Morocco, Jordan, and 
Lebanon were categorized as “partly free.”
148
 Arab regimes heavily censor the news media, 
effectively muzzling the “fourth estate,” a key institution of accountability. Furthermore, with 
democracy still a novel concept to the region, only a handful of states hold free and fair 
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elections, while the majority feature repressive, autocratic regimes. Power in concentrated hands, 
no matter who’s, is problematic for the business environment. It was John Dalberg-Acton who 
said, “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely.” These words are 
rather apt in the Middle Eastern context: the cycle of repression and placation allows political 
leaders to pick winners and losers in the marketplace, distorting market forces and creating a 
culture of cronyism. Additionally, without a free press, it is difficult to accurately assess the 
pervasiveness of corruption in the local economy. The freedom to speak one’s mind is an 
important part of free markets, and absent any major reforms across the region, the chances at a 
fully actualized business environment remain slim. However, with the Arab Spring in the rear 
view mirror, there is more hope than ever in states like Tunisia, for example, that progress is 
around the corner. 
Ethics and the Law: Structural Defects in the MENA Region 
 Beyond cultural and political considerations, the business ethics landscape in the Middle 
East may also be influenced by systemic issues in the way businesses are organized and operate. 
Laws govern the structure of firms, the obligations of their agents and principals, and ultimately, 
the behavior of firms themselves. There is no question that the law is a major source of ethics 
and morality in the business world; often times, the lawful choice is also the moral one. In fact, a 
common analysis of business decisions in an ethics lens starts with the question: is it legal?, 
followed by is it ethical? With this in mind, it might be useful to examine the relative strength of 
the Middle East’s legal framework in the business ethics environment. In Western economies, 
where there is a strong emphasis on the rule of law, there are consistent expectations about the 
form and general objectives of individual firms. The Middle East, however, lacks the same kind 
of legal and structural consistency. As a result, the distinction between legality and ethics may be 
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a bit more muddled in the Arab world. Firms might be incentivized to abuse this increased 
“ethical slack” absent the same legal enforcement regime.  
Islamic Law and the Corporate Form  
Renowned legal scholar and Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit Richard Posner once wrote of the importance of the law in economic development: 
A modernizing nation’s economic prosperity requires at least a modest legal 
infrastructure centered on the protection of property and contract rights. The essential 
legal reform required to create that infrastructure may be the adoption of a system of 
relatively precise legal rules, as distinct from more open-ended standards or a heavy 
investment in upgrading the nation’s judiciary. A virtuous cycle can arise in which 
initially modest expenditures on law reform increase the rate of economic growth, in turn 




Posner correctly emphasizes the degree to which a precise, consistent legal framework can foster 
economic growth, particularly in developing nations. At present, however, Middle Eastern 
businesses must navigate a complex web of government regulations and contend with a 
sprawling and corrupt bureaucracy. Even beyond these surface defects, the Arab world also 
suffers from a business law and contractual tradition that is not well suited to the constraints and 
opportunities of the modern global economy. 
 Timur Kuran, Professor of Islamic Studies at Duke University, has written extensively on 
how commercial law in the Middle East stifles growth potential. He points the blame of the 
underdeveloped legal system in the Middle East squarely at the feet of Islamic Law, which has 
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had significant influence over the Arab world’s legal development for centuries. More 
specifically, he faults three problematic trends: 
The institutions that generated evolutionary bottlenecks include: 1) the Islamic law of 
inheritance, which inhibited capital accumulation; 2) the strict individualism of Islamic 
law and its lack of a concept of corporation, which hindered organizational development 
and contributed to keeping civil society weak; and 3) the waqf, Islam's distinct form of 
trust, which locked resources into organizations likely to become dysfunctional over 
time. These institutions did not pose economic disadvantages at the time of their 
emergence. Nor did they ever cause an absolute decline in economic activity. They 
turned into handicaps by perpetuating themselves during the long period when the West 
developed the institutions of the modern economy.
150
  
Kuran’s argument provides some color to the discussion of the Middle East’s lag behind the 
West in Historical Survey of Business in the Middle East. The second point furthered by 
Kuran is of particular relevance to this paper. The rise of mercantilism and subsequently, the 
Industrial Revolution, necessitated the creation of financial institutions and corporate forms that 
would pool resources and risk as transactions increased in both frequency and value. And yet, as 
Kuran provides, the Arab world remained reliant on archaic forms of enterprise, which were 
more temporary in nature and limited the ability of many individuals to pool resources for a 
business purpose.
151
 Furthermore, even as Arab states have since adopted Western commercial 
codes to catch up with more modern forms of the corporation, they faced growing pains 
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associated with learning a new legal framework, leading to corruption and incompetence, 
problems that persist today.
152
 
 The Arab world attempted to incorporate hundreds of years of maturity of the corporate 
form in the Western world without any of the shared history or the associated development of 
laws and free courts to enforce said laws. As a result, although modern forms of business indeed 
exist in the Middle East, they represent a far smaller proportion of economic activity than their 
counterparts in Western economies. Due in part to the influence of Islamic Law on Middle 
Eastern society, as argued by Kuran, small and medium sized businesses remain king in the 
region, despite the advantages of scale. Economic disadvantages aside, how does this failure to 
properly appreciate the value of the modern corporation connect to business ethics? It is not as if 
exceedingly large corporations are immune from the specter of corruption or abuse. In fact, it 
was not until the 1970s and 80s that many began to advocate a change in the way we should 
view the role of corporations, in part inspired by a number of ethical scandals affecting major 
corporations. Still, there are advantages that the corporate form confers from a business ethics 
perspective. For one thing, the ability to separate the business from its owners limits the degree 
to which the owners can use the business as a vehicle to shield their personal assets. Similarly, a 
properly functioning corporation theoretically aligns the incentives of the employees with the 
shareholders, mitigating the degree to which the owners can exploit or abuse their employees for 
personal gain. Perhaps less obvious is the advantage that scale poses for public users of 
information. Large, mature corporate forms provide a dearth of information to public and private 
users for the purposes of accountability. For example, the regular publishing of independently 
audited financial statements can mitigate the risk of fraud in the marketplace, a phenomenon 
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largely absent for smaller firms. In the Middle East and North Africa, where firms remain 
significantly smaller in comparison and information is hard to come by, investors are left in the 
dark. Furthermore, there is concern that opacity could encourage unethical behavior. Another 
advantage of the corporate form is the ability to organize around a set of rules, collectively 
known as corporate governance, which help bind its actors to ethical standards. Without these 
important checks on the activities of individual firms, decision making becomes concentrated in 
one individual or a small handful. This dynamic in Middle East business form may contribute to 
the poor business ethics landscape and is an important target of reform. 
Bridging the Ethical Chasm: Solutions for 
Improving Business Ethics in the Middle 
East and North Africa 
The bulk of this paper explains the impacts and sources of the poor business ethics 
environment in the Arab world, but absent in our discussion so far are the potential solutions for 
challenging and reforming the current landscape. Using the factors outlined in Cultural, 
Political, and Structural Underpinnings for the Poor Business Ethics Landscape in the 
Middle East, we can propose a plan of action for public, private, and community actors that 
begin to address the defects in the region’s business environment. The confluence of the 
aforementioned factors puts the region at a significant disadvantage when compared to other 
regions, particularly those in the West, in the competition for economic growth, investment, and 
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prosperity. This ethical chasm is a major roadblock to a healthy, growing economic environment 
in the Middle East. Yet even then, it is important to recognize that the business ethics challenge 
is only one of many that lie ahead on the road to proper economic development. Broken politics 
and the brain drain of the region’s top talent will continue to set the region back when compared 
to its counterparts. However, the plan of action outlined in the next few chapters marks an 
important first step in changing the culture of corruption that suffocates entrepreneurship and 
investment in the Arab world. The hope is that by doing so, the region can come that much closer 
to real progress.  
Reforming the State: Public Policy Objectives  
 Although it may seem counterintuitive to look for solutions from the very political 
systems that contribute to the ethical chasm in the first place, there is no question that 
Arab leaders can play a positive role in reform, particularly with respect to combating 
corruption. In fact, in the post-Arab Spring environment, many Arab leaders, even those 
presiding over autocratic governments, have signaled an increased desire to address 
citizen concerns about the pervasiveness of corruption, especially in the bureaucracy.153 
With this in mind, there are three pillars of policy reform that might help alleviate 
corruption in the region: 1. Prioritizing the fight against corruption 2. Improving 
transparency in state processes 3. Reducing for the incentives of corruption at all levels of 
government  
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An Anti-Corruption Ministry? 
 A 1997 policy study by the World Bank found that: 
In a country with heavy corruption and poor governance, the priorities in anti-
corruption efforts would then be to establish rule of law, strengthen institutions of 
participation and accountability, and limit government interventions to focus on 
core mandates. In a country with moderate corruption and fair governance, the 
priorities would be  decentralization and economic reform, results-oriented 
management and evaluation, and the introduction of incentives for competitive 
delivery of public services.154  
Given that much of the Middle East falls into the first category (heavy corruption, poor 
governance), it would be prudent for Arab governments to focus on improving 
transparency and accountability, while also prioritizing corruption reform.  
Lebanon recently took steps to address the scourge of corruption that may serve as 
a model for other Middle Eastern states. As discussed in Case Study: Lebanon in the Shadow 
of Syria, Lebanon’s newly formed government created a new Ministry of State for 
Combatting Corruption, a bold move to assuage concerns from the Lebanese people about 
bribery and graft in the bureaucracy.155 Although far from a complete proposal, the 
Ministry is an important step towards for the government in recognizing that it indeed has 
a role in combating the deep reaches of corruption. Furthermore, even if the Ministry lacks 
significant enforcement power in rooting out corruption, its true significance lies in its 
ability to raise awareness of corruption and its impact on the country. Other Arab states 
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should seek to emulate this important step, but give their anti-corruption mechanisms 
some real enforcement teeth. Anti-corruption officials should have broad authority to 
investigate and prosecute suspected cases of graft; doing so would create a chilling effect 
on the incentives for corruption, while also improving accountability across the state. 
Furthermore, the government should provide adequate protections for whistleblowers, 
ensuring that they feel comfortable in reporting abuse without the specter of adverse 
employment action or intimidation.  
Jordan also took steps in the right direction by strengthening the authority and 
enforcement power of its anti-corruption agency, the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption 
Commission (JIACC).156 Actions such as these help to improve the rule of law and promote 
confidence in the government’s ability to self-police. However, creating anti-corruption 
committees and new ministries are only surface level changes at best. Comprehensive 
reform requires changing the culture of complacency through transparency, as well as 
removing the incentives for corruption at all levels of government. 
Transparency as a Weapon Against Corruption 
 According to Transparency International’s 2016 report on corruption levels across 
the globe, it highlighted a lack of transparency as one of the key factors contributing to the 
higher incidence of corruption in the Middle East and North Africa.157 At the same time, 
there is significant evidence that enhanced transparency helps to reduce the threat of 
corruption; the general principle is that transparency increases accountability and limits 
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abuses behind closed doors.158 Nonetheless, many Arab governments have opaque budget 
processes that leave citizens in the dark about where their tax dollars are spent. 
Furthermore, government proceedings are seldom recorded and made available for public 
view. 
 In the spirit of transparency, Arab governments should publish long form annual 
budgets that explain the flow of public resources, making politicians more accountable to 
taxpayers. Additionally, unless the state has a compelling interest in keeping specific 
information private, government proceedings and meetings with private sector actors 
should be a part of the public record. Furthermore, a 2010 report OECD report titled 
Supporting Investment Policy and Governance Reforms in Iraq, highlighted the importance 
of improving transparency in the public procurement process, particularly by posting 
public procurement notices and giving bidders adequate time to prepare their bids.159 In a 
region where public contracts form a significant part of GDP, this third recommendation 
can be particularly useful in reducing fraud and abuse. The effectiveness of these reforms 
also lies in their practicality: they do not require a massive political sea change, they simply 
reinforce the government’s commitment to the principles of good governance, while 
making corruption a more difficult enterprise.  
Enhanced transparency also effectively targets the culture of complacency (referred 
to as al-fassad al-edary in Arabic) that dominates bureaucracies across the Middle East and 
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North Africa.160 Systematic nepotism stemming from the wasta system places unqualified 
people in the civil service, many of whom are motivated by things other than a commitment 
to public service. From this it follows that shining a light on the activities of officials at all 
levels of government can both align the incentives of bureaucrats with the public good 
while also reducing the pervasiveness of nepotism. This leads us to the third pillar of 
government reform: changing incentives such that corruption is no longer as attractive. 
Lifting incentives for corruption 
 In many ways, the bureaucracy suffers from the same principal-agent problem that 
challenges large corporations. The bureaucracy (the principal) should endeavor to advance 
the interests of the public, but sometimes, the bureaucrats (the agents) are incentivized to 
take actions that benefit themselves, but contradict the interests of the bureaucracy. This is 
especially the case when it comes to corruption: corrupt officials absorb all of the benefits 
of bribery, graft, extortion, etc, but push the costs onto society. With this in mind, it is 
critical that the state enact policies that will realign the incentives of government officials 
with the mission of good governance. 
 As outlined in Corruption in the Middle East and North Africa, petty corruption 
tends to be the most prominent form of public corruption in the region. It is likely that 
without proper controls, many public officials are incentivized to take part in corruption. 
There are three basic strategies that Arab governments can utilize to help lift the incentives 
for corruption: 1. Shrinking the size of the bureaucracy 2. Improving pay and benefits for 
civil servants. 3. Levying stiff penalties for corruption. 
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 With respect to the first recommendation, the Arab world already suffers from 
bloated, overly complex bureaucracies that have a hand in many parts of the regional 
economy. Reducing the size of the bureaucracy would decrease state influence in the 
economy, limiting the willingness of private actors to engage in bribes or other forms of 
corruption to curry state favor. On the second recommendation, paying civil servants 
livable wages will reduce the temptation to seek wealth through corruption while also 
attracting better talent.161 Finally, by increasing the costs of corruption through stiff 
criminal penalties, Arab governments might be able to reduce the attractiveness of 
corruption at all levels of government.  
Targeted Education Campaigns 
 Beyond their duties in combatting corruption, Arab governments also have a pivotal 
role in changing the culture of business ethics in the region by promoting honest business 
practices. For example, public marketing campaigns explaining the harmful impact of wasta 
might be able to change cultural attitudes about nepotism in the public and private sector. 
By raising awareness of the costs of corruption on society, average citizens might be better 
able to recognize forms of corruption masking in cultural tradition while also encouraging 
them to report corruption to the relevant authorities. These social marketing campaigns 
cannot stand alone however, but should instead supplement comprehensive government 
reform at an organizational level.162 In doing so, Arab governments and citizens alike can 
                                                        
161There is empirical evidence that there is a negative relationship between civil servant wages and 
corruption. Van Rijckeghem, C., & Weder, B. (2001). Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of 
temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?. Journal of 
development economics, 65(2), 307-331. 
162 Kindra, G. S., & Stapenhurst, R. (1998). Social marketing strategies to fight corruption. Economic 
Development Institute of the World Bank. 
Habhab 97 
 
play a role in improving the business ethics environment, while also expanding civic 
participation.  
 The public policy objectives outlined in this chapter are not intended to be an 
exhaustive program of reform, but rather highlight some key, practical steps that Arab 
states could undertake to reform business ethics and corruption in the region. In the next 
chapter, we turn to the role of the private sector in making important changes. 
Private Sector Responsibility and the Role of Firms 
 Although the government reforms proposed in the last chapter indeed target some of the 
important political, structural, and cultural underpinnings to the poor business ethics 
environment in the Middle East and North Africa, they ultimately rely on the swift action of state 
actors, which, given the current political climate in the region, is highly unlikely. This shifts 
some responsibility on the private sector to self-reform and self-regulate. Corruption and poor 
business ethics are collective problems; they worsen the economic environment for all firms, 
particularly those with little political clout. As such, the private sector shares significant 
responsibility in leading reform efforts. Furthermore, the increasing focus on the role of firms in 
improving the societies in which they operate and the power of CSR to create macro level 
changes makes private sector reform all the more important.
163
 
A Unified Ethics Board 
 One of the systemic issues in the Middle Eastern economy highlighted in the chapter, 
Historical Survey of Business in the Middle East, was the lack of integration across Arab 
states. This makes cross border political and economic coordination exceedingly difficult, 
despite the fact that many of political and economic issues are shared by all Arab states. The 
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same coordination problem applies in the context of business ethics - how might private sector 
actors in different corners of the region work together to promote ethics and accountability? One 
potential solution is the creation of a region-wide, private sector ethics board. The organization 
could feature representatives from different industries and across nationalities, joining forces for 
the mission of promoting fair dealing and honest business practices. Absent a centralized 
government effort, the board could also call for greater transparency in the private sector. Private 
firms are not immune to the same dangers of opacity experienced in the government. Without the 
principles of transparency, private businesses of all sizes might be concealing the true financial 
health of their business, limiting the willingness of investors to put up capital towards a business 
operation. At present, cultural norms in the Middle East do not place a heavy emphasis on 
transparency in business, and it is instead viewed as an unnecessary expense.
164
 With voices in 
the private sector calling for greater transparency, the region could see a trend focused on greater 
accountability. That being said, there is a risk that this regional ethics board ends up having 
limited influence on actual business activity. Business in the region remains heavily fragmented, 
and in countries like Lebanon, SMEs may constitute close to 90% of businesses.
165
 However, if 
major players set the ethical standard at the top, smaller firms may emulate their business 
practices. 
The Role of CSR 
 Ultimately, as the last subsection highlights, real changes in regional business ethics will 
have to come at the individual firm level. Enter the role CSR can play in changing the way 
business is conducted. Underlying the impetus for firms to employ CSR is the idea that a firm 
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can do well by doing good. There is growing evidence that links socially responsible business 
practices with improved financial performance, driving the growth in CSR activities in the 
Western world.
166
 Furthermore, CSR may have the potential to create a corporate virtuous cycle 
of sorts, improving the general business ethics environment in which socially responsible firms 
operate.
167
 Today, the great majority of large U.S. firms publish annual CSR reports along with 
their financial statements, a demonstrative shift towards socially responsible business 
practices.
168
 There is potential in employing the CSR model in the Middle East as an effective 
tool for improving the business ethics landscape and combating corruption. In their article, Anti-
corruption As Strategic CSR: A call to action for corporations, Greg Hills, Leigh Fiske, and 
Adeeb Mahmud argue that because corruption is a social problem that doubles as a “bottom-line 
business issue,” it is ripe for firm specific targeting through CSR activities.
169
 More specifically, 
they believe that firms can fight corruption as a matter of CSR by ensuring compliance, 
strengthening collective action (a possible role for the proposed unified ethics board), engaging 
the public sector in reform, and using corporate assets as tools against graft.
170, 171
 This proposal 
is interesting for several reasons. First, it asserts the responsibility firms have in tackling 
collective social problems and two, it offers a roadmap for how anti-corruption CSR may be 
applied. However, there is concern that such activities would only be viable in, say, the GCC, 
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where corporations tend to be far larger than those elsewhere, the Levant in particular. 
Furthermore, instituting a culture of CSR in a region where the corporate form is still in its 
infancy is bound to face some cultural resistance. And yet, there is a case to be made that appeals 
to traditional Arab values and Islamic ethics of generosity and charitableness may make firm 
behavior reform more palatable to Arab businesses.
172
 
 In their book, CSR in the Middle East: Fresh Perspectives, Middle East CSR experts 
Dima Jamali and Yusuf Sidani explain this dynamic rather aptly: 
Islamic philanthropy provides a strong foundation for CSR in the region, and constitutes 
a pivotal tradition of voluntary giving that falls outside the realm of presume Western 
largesse… Across the Middle East philanthropic practices and entrenched forms of 
indigenous giving have no doubt been crucial to date in alleviating deep-seated social 
problems. However, with the blowing winds of change, what is needed in the Middle 
East at this critical juncture is a more institutionalized form of modern philanthropy that 
preserves the original social values but mobilizes resources more effectively in 
facilitating social change and promoting sustainable development.
173
  
Despite its Western origins, CSR might actually be more suited to meet the family-oriented and 
community-centric cultural values in the Arab world. With this in mind, introducing CSR as an 
integral part of the business process in the Middle East may be the region’s best bet at changing 
the business ethics culture. A CSR focus could help Arab business owners begin asking the kinds 
of important ethical questions that underlie any critical business decision, helping to change 
business culture from the ground up. The future of reform in the Middle East is unlikely to 
happen at the top, but rather, must begin within the youthful, cosmopolitan, and tech savvy 
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generation that is more likely to see the benefits in the triple bottom line. As such, importing 
CSR and adapting it to the regional culture may be the strongest reform effort for the future. 
 Corporate Governance 
 Intertwined with notions of CSR and business ethics are standards of corporate 
governance, which refer to the rules by which an organization or firm governs itself. These rules 
are often the combination of internally imposed controls and laws mandated by the 
government.
174
 As discussed in Ethics and the Law: Structural Defects in the MENA Region, 
corporate governance standards can play an important role in ensuring that ethical decision 
making flows through all levels of the organization. They help to discipline leaders in the firm 
while also making the firm more attractive for investment.
175
  Strides have been made towards 
adopting OECD corporate governance guidelines among Middle Eastern countries, but these 
standards are mostly relevant at the large firm level, especially banks.
176
 Despite the challenges 
of improving corporate governance standards at the small and medium sized firm level, there are 
still opportunities for stronger internal rules. Smaller enterprises can still draft rules and 
guidelines by which they will conduct their business, covering everything from shareholder 
rights to legal compliance processes. By adopting formal rules, for example, on hiring practices, 
the amount of wasta-connected hiring may be subdued. Firms can refer to these rules for 
guidance on business practices, helping to guide ethical action throughout the organization. 
Enhanced corporate governance standards might also limit the degree to which firm culture is set 
by one particular individual, another structural and cultural challenge that may be contributing to 
the poor business ethics environment. These firm-specific steps, whether through CSR or 
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improved corporate governance, have great potential to reform the standards of ethics in the 
Arab world.  
Civil Society and the Media 
 An important cornerstone of any well-developed political and economic environment is 
the presence of a healthy and vibrant civil society. A strong civil society has the power to turn 
activism into tangible legislation and hold government actors accountable. As such, NGOs and 
other civic institutions can play a vital role in business ethics reform in the Middle East and 
North Africa. In fact, the last 20 years have seen a rise in the number of NGOs that address 
issues of corruption and business ethics in the region. One such organization is the Lebanese 
Transparency Association (LTA), which, states that it “advocates for reform by focusing on 
systemic improvement and by building coalitions with other anti-corruption stakeholders, 
including the government, parliamentarians, the private sector, media institutions, the 
international community and civil society organizations.”
177
 The LTA has, for example, drafted 
Lebanon’s “first code of corporate governance,” in order to encourage Lebanese businesses to 
adopt stronger internal controls as a means for attracting investment.
178
 This kind of proactive 
behavior from NGOs should be encouraged as an important tool for reform. However, outside of 
Lebanon, which is relatively more hospitable to NGOs, government restrictions on free speech 
and civil assembly across the region limit the influence of civil society. One notable bright spot 
in the NGO space is the Hawkamah Institute for Corporate Governance, which, since its 
establishment in 2006, has produced research and held conferences to promote the proliferation 
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of enhanced corporate governance standards for use by regional businesses.
179
 The next step is to 
strengthen the relationship between civil organizations and policy makers, turning activism into 
concrete reform.  
 Another important institution of government and corporate accountability is the news 
media. The Arab world has a strong tradition of press diversity, but the editorial freedom of 
newspapers, television channels, and radio stations varies wildly depending on the country. On a 
general level, however, the trend is towards state censorship and press restriction. Clampdowns 
on freedom of the press can help foster a poor business ethics environment because it results in 
another area of opacity where transparency would do some good. Furthermore, a free news 
media has the power to expose high-profile scandals involving government and corporate actors 
alike, which raises the cost of corruption, thus reducing the willingness of actors to undertake in 
corrupt acts.
180
 The media often takes the moniker the fourth estate for its important role as an 
institution of accountability. One potential workaround state repression of the media is an 
increased emphasis on new media,
181
 which are more difficult to censor and control. Arab 
“muckrakers” might be wise to employ the model of Chinese netizens, who have used digital 
media to improve accountability and increase government transparency, often times connected to 
corruption concerns.
182
 A stronger, more decentralized media, coupled with a healthier civil 
society might be able to take truth to power in a way that makes businesses and government 
officials become more ethically inclined. 
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 In the post Arab Spring era, the Middle East and North Africa has been teetering on the 
edge of true reform and a reversion to the kinds of autocratic power structures that have 
characterized much of its modern history. At the same time, the anger in the Arab Street 
demonstrated that the corruption-laden and poor business ethics landscape status quo is no longer 
working for the Arab people. It opens the door to political instability, limits the growth potential 
of regional businesses, and ensures the continued concentration of power in the hands of an elite 
few, rather than the achievement of widespread prosperity. Despite this grim picture, however, 
lying underneath the chaos and tumultuous change in the Arab world is a real opportunity to 
change the traditions of old. Business has the transformative power to both lift people out of 
poverty and create positive societal change. It need not be the case that economic power be a tool 
of political repression and corruption, but rather that businesses play a role in promoting shared 
success across the region. Indeed, the cultural, political, and structural hurdles facing the region 
represent a steep obstacle on the road to reform, but with common sense policies that root out 
corruption, combined with a heightened sense of firm level responsibility, the move towards a 
more ethical business environment is very much in reach. The reforms outlined in this paper 
represent just an important first step towards bridging the ethical chasm, but nonetheless, offer a 
practical roadmap for Arab businesses and policymakers alike.  
 
 
 
  
  
